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The Affordability Index (AI) model is a conceptual tool which is intended to aid 
logistics analysts, commanders, and maintenance planners in applying scarce 
maintenance funds toward systems that will best improve overall readiness for a 
Functional Area (FA).  The AI model is intended for Marine Corps ground combat 
equipment TAMCNs that are reported in the Marine Corps Automated Readiness 
Evaluation System (MARES) per MCO 3000.11D and listed in McBul 3000.    
 The analysis of the AI model was conducted using eight years of historical data 
that was stored in the Marine Corps Integrated Maintenance Management System 
(MIMMS).  The results of the analysis proved that the model is not a suitable tool for 
evaluating the “affordability” of MARES reportable items due to the upward biasing 
effect that the variable Unit Price (UP) has on the output. 
 The alternative solution to providing a useful decision support tool is the 
readiness-to-cost model.  This model is a graphical display which allows users to conduct 
trend analysis of readiness and maintenance costs over time.  Using the same data from 
the analysis of the AI model, we are able to see trends in the ratio of readiness-to-cost.  It 
is here that we offer commanders, maintenance planners, and logistics analysts a model 
that can provide them with a more intuitive interpretation of the true state of systems 
readiness and the subsequent costs to attain and sustain that readiness. 
 We have recommended that this model be studied in future MBA projects to 
improve the model in several aspects.  The current model is restricted to the use of repair 
parts costs, which is only one element of total support cost.  We believe that future 
projects could focus on this particular variable of the model to determine what cost 
elements should be included and how to track those cost elements.  The model is ideally 
suited for incorporation into the Marine Corps Equipment Readiness Information Tool 
(MERIT) system.  In this regard, we believe that the model could expand into thesis 


























If the principles of logistics were better understood, the budgeters might 
be wiser and more discriminating in the manner in which they limit 
combat forces and at the same time the military secretaries and 
commanders might more effectively manage the resources allotted by the 
budgeters.                       
FMFRP 12-14, Logistics in the National Defense 
 
A. MOTIVATION 
The Marine Corps has a well-known reputation for its ability to “do more with 
less.”  While other services find their budgets shrinking, the Marine Corps has routinely 
been able to provide Congress with evidence to support its budget priorities1.  But with 
the current operational commitments of Marines, both active duty and reserve, 
throughout the world in places such as Afghanistan, the Arabian Gulf, the Horn of Africa, 
Liberia, the Georgian Republic, Colombia, Guantanamo Bay, the Philippines, and most 
importantly, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM2, ground combat equipment is being used at a 
rate that could not have been anticipated in prior budget submissions.  In 2003, for 
example, over 15% of the entire Marine Corps deployed in support of Operation IRAQI 
FREEDOM alone. 
Although the Global War on Terror continues, the current operational tempo will, 
at some point, subside and the Marine Corps will return to a near peacetime pace in order 
to reconstitute its fleet of equipment.  Upon the cessation (or significant mitigation) of 
hostilities, the Marine Corps and other services should expect a significant reduction in 
funding relative to current levels.  Competition for increasingly scarce maintenance 
resources will occur within the Marine Corps, across the services, and across other 
federal agencies.  To meet this challenge, the Marine Corps is aggressively developing 
                                                 
1 United States General Accounting Office.  Defense Budget: Analysis of Operation 
and Maintenance Accounts for 1985-2001 (Letter Report, 02/28/97, GAO/NSIAD-97-
73). 
2 Statement of General Michael W. Hagee, Commandant of the Marine Corps, before 
the Senate Armed Services Committee concerning posture.  February 10, 2004. 
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decision support tools to assist materiel readiness managers in determining the most 
effective means of allocating scare maintenance resources across abundant alternatives 
under conditions of uncertainty. 
 
B. PURPOSE 
 The purpose of this research is to examine a proposed method of combining the 
costs associated with maintaining the Marine Corps suite of ground combat equipment 
with the maintenance readiness achieved by that level of funding in a way that is easily 
obtained, explained, and understood by materiel readiness stakeholders.  We believe that 
such a methodology is not only timely but necessary given the increasing emphasis 
placed on outcomes in the Department of Defense.  No longer can we merely track the 
expenditure of these resources, we must employ them to their greatest impact on the 
Marine Corps warfighting capability at the lowest cost. 
 
C. BACKGROUND 
Until recently, little incentive existed to compare the cost of maintaining 
equipment to its readiness.  Within the Marine Corps, the general consensus was that as 
long as supply and equipment readiness levels were above 90%, Commanders were 
satisfied.  If readiness levels fell, Commanders would simply ask for more money, which 
invariably was forthcoming, creating the perverse incentive to maximize the use of 
maintenance resources to guarantee adequate funding in the future.  As long as cost and 
readiness data were costly to obtain, lower level commanders could defend requests for 
increased funding due to information asymmetry.  Today, advances in communications 
and information technology enable senior leadership to quickly compile, view, and 
analyze data that was once only visible at the organizational level.  The days of providing 
anecdotal evidence to support increases in Operations & Maintenance (O&M) are rapidly 
disappearing.   
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Advances in communications and technology are not the only changes that have 
occurred.  The emergence of terrorists of global reach, the attacks of September 11th, and 
Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom have significantly altered the national 
security environment.  In order to cope with these changes, Secretary of Defense, Donald 
H. Rumsfeld directed the Department of Defense (DoD) to begin transforming the 
military services. 
Our agenda is clear.  The global war on terror is continuing, and it will for 
the foreseeable future.  As we prosecute the war, we’ll need to continue to 
strengthen, improve and transform our forces; modernize and restructure 
programs and command, which we’re working on; streamline DoD 
processes and procedures.  
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, January 6, 20043 
But what is transformation?  DoD guidance describes transformation as: 
“a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and 
cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people, 
and organization that exploit our nation’s advantages and protect against 
our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which 
helps underpin peace and stability in the world.”4 
 
Transformation simply means “change.”  We must change the way we fight, the 
way we communicate, and the way we are organized.  We must also change the way we 
conduct business.  We must become more productive by first using the best business 
practices of industry, and secondly, by using advances in communication and technology 
to develop new analytical tools that are suitable for the defense services. 
Transformation is nothing new to the Marine Corps.  In fact, the Marine Corps is 
notorious for its ability to improvise, adapt, and overcome all sorts of obstacles.  
Although most transformation efforts tend to fail, the Marine Corps has a distinct 
advantage over most organizations because it has already established a culture that is 
conducive to transformation. 
                                                 
3 United States Department of Defense News Briefing.  Transcript. 
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040106-secdef1104.html.  2004. 
4 Transformation Trends.  .Military Transformation:  A Strategic Approach.  
Director, Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense.  Washington, D.C.  
Fall 2003. 
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Curiously, given its innovative culture, the Marine Corps currently has no 
uniform method for comparing the cost of maintaining its suite of ground combat 
equipment to the readiness achieved by that level of funding.  Any cost-to-readiness 
analyses done in the past have been accomplished using anecdotal evidence or through 
non-scientific methods by highly motivated and well-meaning individuals scattered 
throughout the Marine Corps.   
Why hasn’t the Marine Corps developed tools to capture cost-to-readiness 
measures?  It’s partly due to the focus on sustaining the current suite of equipment.  The 
primary reason, however, is that the current supply and maintenance management 
systems were developed in the late 1960’s using computer punch-card technology.  Very 
few database management programs were available commercially, much less within the 
military, to extract and compile the data from stovepiped supply and maintenance 
management systems.  Additionally, very few Marines had the knowledge and training 
necessary to use the programs that were available.  Establishing uniform standards across 
all units was thus impossible.  
The situation, however, has changed.  The Marine Corps now has a method of 
consolidating the cost-to-readiness analysis effort in one web-based system called 
MERIT, and then communicating it to the entire Marine Corps using current supply and 
maintenance management systems.  Without the proper analytical tools, materiel 
readiness managers are struggling to provide their commanders with sound maintenance 
strategies given their current fiscal constraints.  Improvements in the current 
methodology of allocating scarce maintenance resources should not only yield a greater 
return on investment in terms of improved readiness, but also increase the ability of the 
force to protect and sustain combat operations.   
In order to effectively manage the resources devoted to the maintenance of 
combat systems, the Marine Corps must have a tool for analyzing cost and readiness 
trends.  While the Logistics Command tracks the usage of resources as well as the 
readiness levels, the Marine Corps lacks information on the outcomes generated by the 
use of these resources.  Simply put, the Marine Corps lacks the analytical methods to link 
expenditures to readiness outcomes.  
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The Marine Corps would greatly benefit by establishing a measurement for the 
effectiveness and affordability of ground combat equipment.  With the advancements of 
military technology and the global mission of the Marine Corps, commanders at the 
Division and Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) levels need the capability to track and 
influence the maintenance funding of their ground combat assets in order to maintain 
their combat readiness.  Additionally, these commanders need a tool that may be used to 
justify increases in Operations and Maintenance (O&M) appropriations for the Marine 
Corps, as necessary, and the reallocation of appropriations, as needed, to improve 
readiness.    
Marine Corps Logistics Command (LOGCOM) has commissioned the Graduate 
School of Business and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School to test a 
theoretical model that was created as an attempt to link cost and readiness and to provide 
recommendations for refinement or replacement of the model if necessary.  LOGCOM 
has provided the starting point for this research in the form of an Affordability Index 
(AI).  Once an effective method for accomplishing the goal of associating cost and 
readiness has been developed, LOGCOM envisions including this methodology in the 
Marine Corps Equipment Readiness Information Tool (MERIT) as an additional 
analytical module.  In this thesis, we examine the existing measures of effectiveness and 
affordability of ground combat systems in the United States Marine Corps, analyze the 
Affordability Index model, and propose a methodology to improve the allocation of 
resources to these combat systems. 
 
D. SCOPE 
 The readiness of the Marine Corps fleet of ground combat equipment is affected 
by many different factors such as the availability of funding, the number of hours the 
item was operated, the number of rounds fired, the quality of parts, the number and 
availability of mechanics and technicians, etc.  Each of these factors contributes to some 
extent as to how well the equipment is maintained and ultimately the mean-time-
between-failure rate of each item.  In this thesis, however, we limit our analysis to the 
cost of repair parts required to perform corrective maintenance on combat-essential 
ground combat equipment.   
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The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows.  In Chapter II, we describe 
the current methodology employed by Marine Corps leadership for the analysis and 
comparison of like and unlike items of equipment for the purposes of resource (budget) 
allocation.  We also explain what the Marine Corps is currently doing to compare cost to 
readiness.  In Chapter III, we review the literature on affordability assessments, 
benchmarking, and cost-to-readiness analysis methods currently employed or studied in 
private industry, the Department of Defense, and other government agencies.  We present 
our data source and methodology in Chapter IV.  In Chapter V, we describe and analyze 
the Affordability Index Model proposed by Marine Corps Logistics Command.  In 
Chapter VI, we propose a methodology for comparing the readiness-to-cost relationship.  
We test the proposed model using actual historical cost and readiness data and 
subsequently evaluated.  The last chapter concludes and offers recommendations. 
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II. MATERIEL READINESS TOOLS PAST AND PRESENT 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In order to fully illustrate the need for a new analytical tool and empirical 
methodology to explicitly link maintenance expenditures and readiness levels, we must 
first enumerate and describe the systems and tools currently in use within the Marine 
Corps.  Unfortunately, there are no formal tools or methods currently available to all 
materiel readiness stakeholders for developing affordability and cost-to-readiness 
estimates.  Each of the current systems and tools is necessary, but none is sufficient for 
affordability analysis and resource allocation as these tools do not link cost and readiness 
data.  Because of the lack of uniformity, the Marine Corps’ Program Objective 
Memorandum (POM) submissions for maintenance funding lack sufficient integration of 
cost and readiness data.  As a result, the Marine Corps may receive inadequate funding or 
misallocate maintenance resources. 
In this chapter, we describe the methods and models currently used by the Marine 
Corps to analyze the affordability and performance of ground combat weapon systems 
programs.  We demonstrate that, while these systems are useful, they are narrowly 
focused, and do not provide a complete picture of what it costs to maintain the current 
level of maintenance readiness.  We also show that organizations throughout the Marine 
Corps not only use widely varying methods of establishing materiel readiness strategy 
within their organizations, but that they also use anecdotal evidence to make affordability 
assessments because they lack effective cost-to-readiness and affordability assessment 
tools.  We begin our discussion with the current supply and maintenance management 
systems.  We then provide information concerning the analytical models currently being 
used in the management and allocation of resources for ground equipment. 
 
B. SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
 The Marine Corps captures readiness information using the Asset Tracking for 
Logistics and Supply System, Phase II Plus, (ATLASS II+) and the Marine Corps 
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Integrated Maintenance Management System (MIMMS).  ATLASSII+ is currently being 
field tested by the II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), while MIMMS is being used by 
the rest of the Marine Corps.  Supply readiness and supply parts requisition status’ are 
reported using the Asset Tracking Logistics and Supply System and the Supported 
Activities Supply System.  These systems are discussed below. 
 
1. Marine Corps Integrated Maintenance Management System 
(MIMMS) 
The Marine Corps manages the maintenance of its ground combat equipment 
using the Marine Corps Integrated Maintenance Management System (MIMMS).  
MIMMS operates by a set of manual procedures to control the use of personnel, money, 
facilities, and materiel applied to the maintenance of ground combat equipment.  Its 
primary purpose is to increase equipment readiness with minimum expenditure by using a 
uniform maintenance system.5 
 MIMMS is supported by an Automated Information System (AIS) and was 
developed in the late 1960’s using computer punch-card technology.  It is capable of 
interfacing with existing Marine Corps systems and programs, but only to the extent that 
MIMMS is able to extract shipping status’ for parts on order.  MIMMS and MIMMS/AIS 
are utilized at all levels of the organization, including maintenance echelons from the 
individual unit up to and including the maintenance depots.  It provides management 
visibility at the user level while simultaneously collating maintenance engineering 
analysis information for item management at the depot and project management levels. 
 MIMMS/AIS provides the equipment repair status of equipment currently in the 
repair cycle.  The MIMMS data warehouse also contains historical maintenance 
management transactions.  Maintenance management clerks enter into MIMMS/AIS the 
status of equipment currently in the repair cycle, add new equipment to the database, or 
correct discrepancies of previously entered data.  The parts required to repair the item are 
entered into the Supported Activities Supply System (SASSY), which is discussed in the 
next section. 
                                                 
5 MCO P4790.2C w/Ch 1, “MIMMS Field Procedures Manual”, Washington, D.C., 
July 1994. 
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2. Asset Tracking for Logistics and Supply System, Phase II Plus, 
(ATLASS II+) 
Asset Tracking for Logistics and Supply System, Phase II Plus, (ATLASS II+) is 
the management information system designed to provide the U.S. Marine Corps with a 
real-time view of organizational and intermediate level maintenance, supply, and material 
readiness support.  The system allows maintenance and supply officers to track all 
equipment, gear, and assets inducted into the maintenance cycle, to requisition parts 
online, and to control assets from a single, integrated platform. ATLASS II+ is the 
Marine Corps' integrated supply, maintenance, and material readiness system providing 
functional tasks and reporting features in support of asset management. 
ATLASSII+ is a slight improvement over MIMMS is that it is Windows-based 
and much more user friendly.  However, ATLASSII+ does not eliminate any of the 
manual procedures that are required in maintenance management technical manuals or 
maintenance management policy and procedures such as the requirement to continue 
using Equipment Repair Orders (ERO) that must be filled-out by-hand and manually 
input by maintenance management clerks. 
 
3. Supported Activities Supply System (SASSY) 
The Supported Activities Supply System (SASSY) is the mainframe computer 
system used to maintain accountability of inventories and requisitions within the First and 
Third Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF and II MEF, respectively), Reserves, 
Quantico, 29Palms, and deployed forces.  It is operated at the intermediate level of the 
supply system, at the SASSY Management Unit (SMU).  SASSY performs the retail 
supply support functions including “stock replenishment, requirement determination, 
receipts, inventory, stock control, and asset visibility. It maintains requisition and 
accountability files for both using units and intermediate levels of inventory.”6 
Because it is operated at the intermediate level, SASSY relies on the Asset 
Tracking Logistics and Supply System (ATLASS) for the unit-level information and 
updates to the system.  Information regarding the issue, receipt, or requisition of 
                                                 
6 UM 4400-124 Supported Activities Supply System 
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equipment is entered manually at the using unit level in ATLASS and sent daily to the 
SMU.  Updates are batch-processed daily on the mainframe computer.  
Like MIMMS, SASSY interfaces with AIS systems such as the Marine Corps 
Equipment Readiness Information System (MERIT), and the Joint Total Asset Visibility 
(JTAV), which provides users near real-time asset visibility on the battlefield.  Although 
the ATLASS/SASSY system is antiquated and relies on manual input and processing, the 
information contained in the SASSY mainframe is used as input for more robust data 
analysis systems, such as MERIT.  By combining the old with the new, the Marine Corps 
is making progress toward better asset tracking and logistics management. 
 
C. ANALYTICL MODELS/SYSTEMS 
 The Marine Corps has been painfully slow in developing new maintenance 
management systems that will more easily allow materiel readiness managers to perform 
effective materiel readiness analysis of ground combat equipment.  ATLASSII+ has only 
recently been field-tested with II MEF, and as the name implies, it has gone through 
several iterations prior to this field-testing.  Because the slow pace to develop a new 
information system, Marine Corps Logistics Command (LOGCOM) has taken the lead to 
create some tools that will use the legacy systems described above, but reformat the 
output to make it much more user-friendly and readable.  These systems also have the 
added benefit of allowing materiel readiness managers to have quick access to historical 
data and interactive queries to use for budgeting and maintenance strategy 
implementation purposes.  Three of these systems, MERIT, Visibility and Management 
of Operating and Support Costs (VAMOSC), and the System-level Total Ownership Cost 
(STOC), are discussed in this section.  We will also explain the Depot Level Maintenance 
Program (DLMP).  This program is essentially the closest formal process the Marine 
Corps has to measure the cost associated with materiel readiness.  
 
1. Marine Corps Equipment Readiness Information System (MERIT) 
MERIT is a web-enabled tool which graphically depicts the current readiness 
posture and detailed supply and maintenance information for all Marine Corps readiness 
reportable Table of Authorized Materiel Control Numbers (TAMCN).  MERIT combines 
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the Supply Chain Operational Performance Enabler (SCOPE) program developed in the 
FMF (III MEF), the Materiel Readiness Assessment Module (MRAM) program from 
LOGCOM (formerly known as MATCOM), the efforts of the Post Fielding Support 
Analysis (PFSA) initiative, and commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) software introduced by 
Concurrent Technologies Corporation (CTC).  MERIT extracts legacy data from Marine 
Corps systems such as MIMMS, ATLASSII+, and SASSY. 
MERIT transforms supply and maintenance management data into valuable 
information that provides a dynamic adaptable view of Equipment Readiness by 
Commodity and Functional Area.  An automatic graphics generator feature provides 
customized information of current and historical readiness and is ideal for developing 
readiness related briefing charts at all levels within the Marine Corps.  Using a drilldown 
approach, MERIT takes the user from the top-level of Marine Corps readiness posture to 
the supply status of specific parts.  By drastically reducing the readiness information data 
gathering effort, MERIT enables users to solve and prevent readiness problems. 
MERIT also provides a total view of the Marine Corps readiness picture.  It gives 
Force Commanders visibility of their readiness trends, problems and associated causes.  
Figure 1 is an example of one of these displays.  MERIT also provides detailed 
information required by maintainers, Logistics Management Specialist (LMS’s), Program 
Managers (PM’s), and analysts. 
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Figure 1.   MERIT display of Readiness by Commodity and Functional Area 
 
Materiel readiness is an issue that affects all Marines, so as the Marine Corps 
moves from reactive to proactive life cycle management, it is essential that we address 
both current and future materiel readiness challenges.  In Nov 2000, LOGCOM formed 
the Materiel Readiness Integrated Product Team (MRIPT), which brought together a 
cross-functional team that focused on materiel readiness policy, calculations, displays, 
reporting and procedures.  First, the MRIPT identified those Materiel Readiness drivers 
that have the greatest impact on the Marine Corps readiness posture.  Second, the MRIPT 
developed changes to MR policy necessary to more effectively monitor and influence 
MR to achieve the best-value solution from a total ownership cost perspective.  Third, the 
MRIPT began developing an information tool, which would allow us to not only display 
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readiness data but would also provide a “drill down analysis” capability that could be 
used throughout the Marine Corps Enterprise.  The bottom line is that MERIT is the tool 
that will move the Marine Corps toward a single materiel readiness capability. 
 
2. The System-level Total Ownership Cost (STOC) Model 
In an attempt to analyze cost information, the Marine Corps Logistics Command 
(LOGCOM) developed a cost model called the System-level Total Ownership Cost 
Model (STOC).  The purpose of STOC was to identify various aspects of a systems life 
cycle cost.  The STOC model identified 14 major cost elements that apply to the total 
cost of a system.  The premise behind including the major costs associated with a 
system’s life cycle was to allow a program manager or analyst to view the cost of a 
system over its life cycle and make life cycle cost estimates based on actual data.  By 
capturing these costs, the STOC model could be used to identify systems to invest limited 
resources.  Table 1 below lists the 14 major cost elements that were included in the 
STOC model.  By capturing the major operational cost elements that comprise between 
60 and 80 percent of a given systems total life cycle costs,  STOC served as a useful tool 
in providing cost elements when cost-to-readiness assessments were made.  Eventually, 
STOC became obsolete and was replaced by Visibility and Management of Operating 
and Support Costs (VAMOSC).7 
Table 1.   Major Cost Elements Accumulated by the STOC Model 
RDT&E  Depot Maintenance 
Procurement  Operator Training 
Operator Labor Maintainer Training 
Organizational Maintenance Parts  Fuel 
Organizational Maintenance Labor  Munitions 
Intermediate Maintenance Parts  Post Deployment Software  




                                                 
7 Kuusisto, T. J., and Williamson M. A. “The Application of Data Analysis Tools To 
Target And Monitor Logistics-Based Improvement Programs”, United States Marine 
Corps Materiel Command.  (n.d.). 
 16
3. Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs 
(VAMOSC) 
 The Navy Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs 
(VAMOSC) management information system collects and reports US Navy and US 
Marine Corps historical weapon system operating and support (O&S) costs.  VAMOSC 
provides the direct O&S costs of weapon systems, some linked indirect costs (e.g., ship 
depot overhead), and related non-cost information such as flying hour metrics, steaming 
hours, age of aircraft, etc.  Registered users may access VAMOSC data via the world-
wide web.  Pre-built queries are available as well as the ability to create custom queries.  
No special software needs to be installed on a user's desktop; only an Internet browser is 
required.  
This relational database contains up to 20 years of data presented by fiscal year by 
alternative hierarchical cost element structures for 343 USMC Ground Combat Systems.  
The weakness with VAMOSC is that it is not able to tie the materiel readiness associated 
with these costs. 
 
4. Depot Level Maintenance Program (DLMP) 
 During the 1990’s, the Marine Corps Materiel Command began transforming the 
way in which depot maintenance funding and maintenance resources are allocated.  The 
DLMP process was established in 1997 in order to provide “an objective and formalized 
depot-level maintenance requirements determination process”8 that would accurately 
identify depot maintenance requirements and reduce the cost of doing business.  This 
process is still being used by Marine Corps Materiel Readiness Officers and DoD 
executives and managers as a way of determining the appropriate level of Operations & 
Maintenance funding required for depot-level repairs.   
One of the major strengths of this program is that it ensures the most beneficial 
allocation of maintenance funding and resources is obtained to meet the needs of the 
warfighter.  The process achieves this goal by including a wide variety of stakeholders to 
include program and resource managers, but most importantly, the warfighter himself.  
                                                 
8 Marine Corps Logistics Command.  “Depot Level Maintenance Program 
Handbook.”  Albany, Georgia.  (n.d.). 
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The end-result of the process is a prioritized and optimized requirements list based on 
warfighting capabilities that balances depot maintenance requirements against life cycle 
management functions.  Furthermore, the communication between these stakeholders has 
instilled confidence in the results of the process.  
 The major shortfall with the DLMP process is that it focuses on sustainment of 
current systems.  The Marine Corps maintenance depots are required to ensure that the 
equipment in the Marine Corps inventory is operationally ready when needed.  The job of 
determining what equipment the Marine Corps possesses is left to the Joint Chiefs, 
Headquarters Marine Corps, and the program managers.  DLMP falls short, as the other 
systems above, in giving stakeholders a clear picture of how much money it takes to 
maintain the current or a higher level of maintenance readiness. 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
The Marine Corps’ old methods of focusing on materiel readiness and the 
sustainment of its ground combat equipment, although necessary, are not sufficient in 
today’s competitive environment.  The old stovepiped systems do not provide a clear 
picture of what it costs to maintain an appropriate readiness level.  While the DLMP 
process is a very effective means of sustaining the fleet, we must now develop tools to 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter II, we showed that the Marine Corps currently has no formal tools or 
methods for measuring the affordability and cost-to-readiness of maintaining its fleet of 
ground combat equipment.  This may seem surprising considering the huge advances in 
computing and data processing technology over the past 10-20 years.  Clearly though, the 
DoD can no longer afford to continue doing business as usual.  Since the DoD doesn’t 
possess these tools, we must look to our only other source for affordability assessment 
models:  private industry.   
Although private industry is focused on maximizing shareholder wealth, while the 
military is focused on national defense, we can still gain valuable insights from it.  We 
must be very careful, however, in attempting to take a cost-benefit model from the private 
industry and then apply it directly to the defense department.  Whereas private industry 
has considerable flexibility in changing corporate policy to meet new threats from their 
competition, the federal government typically moves slowly through many bureaucratic 
channels, by design of course.  Fortunately though, private industry is still a very 
valuable source of information as you will soon see. 
In this chapter, we show that this thesis is an entirely new area of research, and 
that there are no specific tools in either industry or within the DoD that we could  adopt 
as our model.  We begin our literature review by discussing the topic of affordability as it 
pertains to the DoD.  We then discuss other performance measurements used within 
private industry that are particularly useful to this thesis such as benchmarking, the 
SCOR model, and the merit function.   
 
B. AFFORDABILITY 
The term “affordability” means different things to different people.  In other 
words, it is an abstract term that is subject to interpretation.  For example, the dictionary 
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definition of affordability is “believed to be within ones financial means.”9  If we applied 
this to the Marine Corps, we would say that a particular weapon system is affordable if 
we have the money to acquire and sustain it.   However, someone else may interpret it to 
mean that if weapon system A costs less than weapon system B, then weapon system A is 
more affordable.  Even the DoD is vague when discussing affordability.  In 2003, The 
DoD issued the following guidance in the “Defense Acquisition System,” DoD 5000.1: 
All participants in the acquisition system shall recognize the reality of 
fiscal constraints. They shall view cost as an independent variable, and the 
DoD Components shall plan programs based on realistic projections of the 
dollars and manpower likely to be available in future years. To the greatest 
extent possible, the MDAs shall identify the total costs of ownership, and 
at a minimum, the major drivers of total ownership costs. The user shall 
address affordability in establishing capability needs.10 
Note that the term “affordability” is used, and in fact required, but the DoD failed to 
adequately define the term.   
Fortunately, the Office of Naval Research (ONR) 334, Affordability Research 
Program has defined affordability for us as: 
the characteristic of a system that enables it to be procured when it is 
needed, supported so it remains available, and operated at the level of 
performance quality desired; all for a reasonable cost that is within the 
(life cycle) budget allocated to all systems being procured and operated.11 
The definition is divided into four basic parts:  acquisition, sustainability, performance, 
and cost.  We find this definition appropriate for our study because we are focused on the 
last three parts.  Since our study examines Marine Corps ground equipment in the 
operational phase of the equipment life-cycle, our model will assist materiel readiness 
managers in locating potential cost and readiness problems and correcting them before 
they become critical issues.  We are using performance measures such as supply and 
equipment readiness percentages in our model.  Obviously, the cost to support the 
                                                 
9 Random House Unabridged Dictionary, 2 ed.  Random House.  New York.  1993. 
10 Department of Defense.  “Defense Acquisition System.”  DoD 5000.1, May 2003. 




equipment at a particular readiness level is essential to this study.  Therefore, we will use 
the ONR definition for the remainder of this report when referring to affordability issues. 
 
C. BENCHMARKING 
One of the most important aspects of analyzing affordability and cost-to-readiness 
is measuring changes over time.  For example, maintenance managers are interested in 
readiness trends to see indication of potential problems, or to see how effective a new 
maintenance policy has been.  Another important aspect is comparing readiness 
performance of equipment with some established standard.  This is usually referred to as 
benchmarking.  Benchmarking is a term, initially used by manufacturing companies to 
compare their performance against the industry standard in which they compete, but is 
now used in many industries because of its usefulness as a performance measurement 
tool.  Benchmarking is more formally defined as “a standard by which something can be 
measured or judged.”12 
In the book “Benchmarking Strategies:  A Tool for Profit Improvement,” Rob 
Reider defines benchmarking as: 
“A process that looks at how things are done in an organization in an 
effort to identify and implement internal and external best practices in a program 
of continuous improvement.”13 
Mr. Reider explains that benchmarking is a “comparative process.”  That is to say, 
individuals, groups, or in our case, equipment, is compared in relation to one another in 
order to measure how well they are performing.  He lists five types of benchmarking: 
1. Internal Benchmarking: Analysis of existing practices 
within various operating areas of the company identifies 
activities, drivers, and best performance. 
2. External Benchmarking: External benchmarking consists 
of comparing company operations to other organization in 
some kind of formal study. 
3. Competitive Benchmarking: Looks to the outside to identify 
how other direct competitors of the company are performing. 
                                                 
12 Hyperdictionary.  http://www.hyperdictionary.com/.  2003. 
13 Reider, Rob.  “Benchmarking Strategies:  A Tool for Profit Improvement.”  John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc.  New York.  2000. 
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4. Industry Benchmarking: Attempts to identify trends, 
innovations, and new ideas within the company’s specific 
industry. 
5. Best-in-Class Benchmarking: Looks across multiple industries 
to identify new, innovative practices-regardless of their 
source. 
Of these various types listed by Mr. Reider, only Internal Benchmarking is relevant to our 
study because this type of benchmark is usually associated with things such as 
organizational policy statements, legislation, laws, regulations, contractual and funding 
arrangements, budgets, schedules, and detailed plans.   
This method is relevant to our study because we already have organizational 
policy statements concerning materiel readiness.  For example, Status of Resources and 
Training System (SORTS) order explains that if a unit has equipment readiness greater 
than 90%, it is considered capable of undertaking its “full wartime missions for which it 
is organized or designed.”14  This measurement is also an organizational goal.  So as we 
analyze the equipment readiness of a particular item of equipment, we could flag items 
that have readiness rates that fall below 90% or other break points to indicate potential 
problem areas.   
Another example of how this method could be used is by indicating on a chart 
how much money was budgeted for the maintenance of an item of equipment.  This line 
is the benchmark for budgeting purposes.  If spending for the item continually exceeds 
this point, it may indicate that there is a performance problem with the equipment.  
Maintenance managers could then investigate the causes early in the process, and then 
implement a plan to remedy it before the problem becomes severe. 
Because our study seeks to graphically illustrate changes over time for cost and 
maintenance readiness, and also because we believe that measuring readiness against a 
specific standard lends credibility to the results of cost-to-readiness models, we believe 
that benchmarking has merit for this thesis. 
 
 
                                                 
14 Marine Corps Order P3000.13D.  Status of Resources and Training System. 
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D. SUPPLY CHAIN OPERATIONS REFERENCE (SCOR)  MODEL 
The DoD routinely seeks the expertise of governmental consulting firms to assist 
them in improving processes and in the development of analytical tools.  One such firm is 
the Logistics Management Institute, a non-profit organization whose mission is simply to 
advance government management.  In June 1999, LMI released a study called, “Supply 
Chain Management:  A Recommended Performance Measurement Scorecard."15  The 
purpose of the study was “to propose a set of balanced performance measures that senior 
decision-makers can use to monitor supply chain effectiveness.”  One of the performance 
measures that were discussed in the study was the SCOR model.   
The SCOR model is used to examine a supply chain from the suppliers’ supplier 
to the customer’s customer.  It defines the processes that make up the supply chain, 
assigns metrics to the processes, and then compares them to benchmarks within that 
particular industry.  It is comprised of four management process:  Plan, Source, Make, 




Figure 2.   SCOR Model Supply Chain 
 
The LMI study also discussed SCOR Enterprise Performance Measures that are 
designed to measure the efficiency and effectiveness of the DoD supply chain.  The 
SCOR Level 1 performance measures are: 
• Delivery performance 
                                                 
15 Logistics Management Institute.  “Supply Chain Management:  A Recommended  
Performance Measurement Scorecard.”  McLean, Virginia.  1999.   
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• Fill rate 
• Order fulfillment lead-time 
• Perfect order fulfillment 
• Supply chain response time 
• Production flexibility 
• Total supply chain management cost 
• Value-added productivity 
• Warranty cost 
• Cash-to-cash cycle times 
• Inventory days of supply 
• Asset turns 
Although the SCOR model includes a standard set of performance measures, 
some of the measures do not work very well in the DoD.  For example, LMI doesn’t 
believe warranty costs as a useful measure of the DoD supply chain because unless the 
maintenance depots activities offer warranties on secondary item repairs, this is not 
applicable.  However, LMI does believe that most of these measures are very applicable 
to the DoD, and recommend the following measures to provide customer service, cost, 
and readiness and sustainability perspectives: 
Customer service: 
• Perfect order fulfillment 
• Order fulfillment lead-time 
• Supply chain response time 
Cost: 
• Percent change in customer price compared to inflation 
• Supply chain management costs as a percentage of sales at standard price 
• Inventory turns 
Readiness and Sustainability Perspectives: 
• Upside production flexibility 
In addition to the performance measures listed above, LMI recommends that DoD 
include the following performance measure, which is not included in the SCOR model, to 
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the Cost Perspective:  Weapon system logistics costs as a percent of acquisition price.  
This cost perspective is more appropriate to weapons systems than the order focus of the 
SCOR model.  They also recommend including weapon system non-mission capable 
rates to the Readiness and Sustainability Perspective.  Our research is applicable to these 
additional performance measures recommended by LMI because they directly relate to 
both the Affordability Index model in Chapter V and the readiness-to-cost model in 
Chapter VI.   
In conclusion, the SCOR model is relevant to this study because successful 
materiel readiness strategy hinges on the supply chains ability to get the right parts and 
services to the right place, at the right time, and in the right quantity.   Furthermore, the 
LMI recommendations above establish the guidance for continued study in this area of 
research.   
 
E. THE MERIT FUNCTION  
Cost-benefit analysis is used when comparing different alternatives to see what 
economic benefits are derived from the costs associated with those alternatives.  In 
private industry, the “benefit” most often spoken of in a cost-benefit analysis is usually 
focused on profit margins, however, the DoD has a difficultly in using this type of 
analysis because the benefits derived from the costs incurred are often intangible, and 
therefore, difficult to measure.  For example, how does one measure the benefit of long-
range nuclear missiles if we never use them?  Is the nuclear missile actually deterring 
attacks against the homeland, or are our enemies simply not inclined to attack us for other 
reasons? 
One way of approaching an analysis of this kind is by using the “merit function.”  
The merit function has its origins in mathematics and is defined as: 
“A function that measures the agreement between data and the fitting 
model for a particular choice of the parameters.  By convention, the merit 
function is small when the agreement is good.”16 
 
                                                 
16 Wolfram Research.  Mathworld.  http://mathworld.wolfram.com.  2004. 
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In 1995, a group an analysts, Edward V. Byrns, Jr., Eric Corban, and Steven A. 
Ingalls, conducted a study that suggested a possible method of measuring the cost-benefit 
of military systems using the merit function.  Dr. Byrns etal defined the merit function as 
“the ratio of quantified system benefit to system life cycle cost” where “system benefit is 
measured by a unique utility function that quantifies the degree to which a given system 
configuration satisfies and identified set of customer requirements”, and where the life 
cycle cost measure “can be developed using any valid estimation technique.”  The 
authors believe that this approach “provides for objective and reliable decision 
making.”17  The authors also showed that this approach is useful for comparing similar 
items during the acquisition phase as well as unique items that don’t have anything from 
which to compare it.  We believe that this approach would also be useful during the 
operational phase of a weapon systems life cycle because we could potentially use it to 
decide if we what to increase spending to achieve even higher levels of maintenance 
readiness.   
The merit function given in the Byrns etal paper is: 
M = B/C 
where M represents overall merit, B derived benefit, and C Life Cycle Cost.  Essentially, 
M is the slope of the line, so an increase in cost corresponds to an increase in benefit.  A 
graphical example of the merit function is given in Figure 3.   
                                                 
17 Byrns, Edward V., Jr., Corban, J. Eric, and Ingalls, Stephen A.  “A Novel Cost-
Benefit Analysis for Evaluation of Complex Military Systems.”  Acquisition Review 
Quarterly.  Winter 1995. 
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Figure 3.   Graphical Representation of the Merit Function. 
 
In this example, there are four systems.  Systems 1 and 2 have the same merit 
because they fall on the same line.  System 4 is below the slope, therefore is has the 
lowest merit, and finally, System 3 has the highest merit since it falls above the slope.  
Therefore, a rational decision maker would chose the system with the highest merit. 
Now, applying this to our study, consider a system within the Marine Corps 
inventory that fell on point 1.  If materiel readiness managers were interested in moving 
the item from point 1 to point 3, they would have to develop a strategy that would 
simultaneously reduce cost and increase readiness.  We also believe this approach would 
be very useful when reviewing the materiel readiness progress over time.    
 One of the primary issues that needs to be addressed in this method is that the 
analyst must ensure that the underlying circumstances that are used to calculate the level 
of merit, i.e. benefit and cost, are quantifiable.  In our case, this is not a problem because 
our data comes from actual cost and readiness data obtained during the operational phase 




 In this chapter, we provided evidence that the DoD and government consulting 
firms are adamant about the need for developing effective affordability assessment tools.  
We showed that the definition of “affordability” is vague and is subject to widely varying 
interpretations. We also discussed several different areas from the private industry that 
are useful to this study such as benchmarking, which is useful for comparing changes in 
performance over time, and the merit function, which provides precedence for applying a 
cost-to-readiness ratio when measuring the costs associated with the intangible benefits 
derived from those costs.  Finally, we have shown that this study is unprecedented within 
the DoD.    
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IV. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 This chapter introduces the data sources and methodology used to evaluate the 
Affordability Index (AI) model proposed by Marine Corps Logistics Command 
(LOGCOM), and for the readiness-to-cost model proposed in Chapter VI.  Materiel 
readiness data is found exclusively in MIMMS, ATLASSII+, and SASSY.  Over the past 
decade, many adhoc programs have been developed by nearly every organization, from 
the organic units to LOGCOM, because the original management-level reports have 
become obsolete in today’s rapidly changing environment.   The most recent programs, 
and arguably the most frequently used by materiel readiness managers, are VAMOSC 
and MERIT (see Chapter II), which were developed and are maintained by LOGCOM.  
However, the data source for these programs originates from MIMMS, ATLASSII+, and 
SASSY, and each will be fully described within this chapter.   
 
B. DATA SOURCE 
The data used for this study were provided by Marine Corps Logistics Command, 
Albany, Georgia.   We used 8 years (1996-2003) of maintenance management data 
entered into the Marine Corps Integrated Maintenance Management System (MIMMS) 
by the I and III Marine Expeditionary Force’s (MEF).  These two organizations were 
chosen because they provide a very large data sample, are active Fleet Marine Force 
(FMF) organizations, and have used MIMMS to enter maintenance management data for 
the previous eight years.  II MEF, on the other hand, switched to the Asset Tracking for 
Logistics and Supply System, Phase II Plus, (ATLASS II+) in 2000.  ATLASSII+ is 
simply an improved version of MIMMS that is being field-tested by II MEF.  
The data consists of header and trailer information entered from the Equipment 
Repair Orders (ERO) of organizations throughout the Marine Corps.  These organizations 
not only include the active duty Marine Corps, but also the Marine Corps maintenance 
depots, the Reserves, and other bases, posts, and stations. 
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C.   DATA CLEANSING 
Our initial MIMMS database contained nearly 5 million Equipment Repair Orders 
(ERO).  We wanted to capture all costs associated with the repair parts and secondary 
reparables located in EROs opened on Marine Corps Automated Readiness Evaluation 
System (MARES) reportable, combat deadlined equipment within I and III MEFs.  When 
an ERO is opened in MIMMS, the maintenance clerk enters a maintenance category code 
(catcode), which identifies the criticality of the repair action being performed.  The 
following table lists and defines each of the catcodes used in MIMMS:  
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Table 2.   Maintenance Category Codes 
 
Code Definition 
M This is a deadlined MARES reportable, i.e. mission-essential, item that requires 
critical maintenance which prevents the item from performing its intended mission.  
For example, a broken transmission on a 7-ton truck or an inoperable recoil 
mechanism on a 155 mm Howitzer.  A general rule-of-thumb is that an item is 
considered deadlined if it cannot “shoot, move, or communicate.” 
 
X This is a non-deadlined MARES reportable item that requires critical maintenance 
which degrades its ability to perform its intended mission such as an inoperable 
fording kit on a HMMWV (High Mobility, Multi-Wheeled, Vehicle).  The HMMWV 
does not need its fording kit to carry troops, weapons, or equipment, but it would not 
be able to ford streams, thereby degrading its ability to move as designed. 
 
P A non-MARES reportable item requiring critical maintenance which deadlines or 
degrades the operational capability of the item.  A non-MARES reportable item is any 
item NOT listed in the MCBul 3000 such as M-16A2 Service Rifles and the M-101 
utility trailer. 
 
C This code is applicable to major components which deadline or prevent parent end 
items from operating at full capacity.  Catcode C EROs are primarily used for 
intershop use.  The status of the end item must be reported through the use of category 
code M, X, P, or N EROs.  Category code C is used to distinguish between repair for 
return to the parent item, and return to the supply system (as in the case of secondary 
reparables inducted into maintenance via category code F, H, or D EROs).  For 
example, the HMMWV is a component of a MRC-138 radio set.  If the HMMWV is 
deadlined, two EROs would be opened - the HMMWV would be opened as a catcode 
M ERO, but the MRC-138 would be opened as a catcode C ERO to indicate that 
although the HMMWV is deadlined, the radio itself can still communicate.   
 
D Depot reparable items such as tank engine rebuilds would receive this catcode. 
 
F, H Secondary reparables such as truck alternators are identified by this catcode. 
 
K When an item only needs to be calibrated, it is identified with this code. 
 
O This code is used to capture shop overhead costs for things like pre-expended bin 
items that are required to maintain equipment. 
 
S SL-3 applications of operator/crew (1st echelon) components are identified by this 
code.  Examples of SL-3 include things such as radio antennae’s, machine gun spare 
barrel bags, and seat cushions and doors for vehicles. 
 
N This code is used when non-critical maintenance is needed, but only in situations 
where a more specific code is not applicable. 
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In the initial data cleansing process, SQL was used because of the large number or 
records.  There are many different ways one could go about cleansing the data.  
Regardless of how this is done, the end result must be to capture all MARES reportable 
EROs (or records) pertaining I and III MEF as well as the associated parts ordered on 
those EROs.   
The most obvious place to start is by removing all units except I and III MEFs.  In 
our study, we want to compare the cost-to-readiness of Marine Corps ground combat 
equipment.  Because materiel readiness is measured for MARES reportable items only, 
we were also able to quickly remove all EROs pertaining to non-MARES reportable 
TAMCNs, regardless of the catcode, from the database.  By default, this query also 
removed all catcode P EROs because this catcode is used exclusively for non-MARES 
reportable equipment.  Just in case any catcode P EROs remained, another query was run 
to remove them.  The remaining records to this point were EROs associated with 
MARES reportable TAMCNs in I and III MEFs.  A simple query was run to keep only 
MARES reportable TAMCNs.    
 Again, since we are trying to compare the cost associated with maintaining the 
current readiness level, we decided that any catcode that did not effect readiness either 
positively or negatively, such as O, S, and N could be removed.  As explained in Table 2, 
catcode O, or shop overhead, EROs are used to capture overhead costs for things like pre-
expended bin items that are required to maintain equipment, and they do not deadline any 
equipment.  As with catcode O, catcode S is not a deadlining EROs because the SL-3 
gear is optional in most cases.  Since catcode N is used for non-critical repairs when no 
other catcode is appropriate, it stands to reason that this catcode does not effect materiel 
readiness. 
 The remaining catcodes to this point were M, X, C, D, F, H, and K.  We definitely 
wanted to keep catcode M EROs since these definitely affect MARES reportable 
equipment readiness, but because X EROs do not negatively effect equipment readiness 
rates, we removed them.  Catcode K is used when calibrating equipment.  While it is true 
that an item can be deadlined if it fails the calibration, the K ERO is closed and an 
appropriate deadlining ERO is opened.  Consequently, we removed all K EROs based on 
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this understanding.  Catcode D EROs are used for depot-level repairs.  This catcode is 
used when an item it taken out of a unit’s inventory and evacuated to the depot for 
repairs.  The unit then places another item on order.  The unit’s supply readiness would 
go down accordingly, but the equipment readiness would go up since the deadlined item 
is no longer in the unit’s inventory.  When the item arrives at the depot, it loses its 
“identity” and goes into a maintenance pool.  Once the item is repaired, it is unlikely it 
will be returned to the unit.  It is sent back to the fleet based on the requisitioning unit 
possessing the highest urgency-of-need and priority.  If the original unit expected to get 
the item back, it would use an M catcode.  Therefore, all D catcodes were removed are 
not applicable to the FMF. 
Any catcode C, or component, EROs that deadlined the major end-item was kept, 
and all others were eliminated.  The same reasoning was used for deciding which 
secondary reparable catcodes, i.e. F and H, to keep. 
When we completed the cleansing of the catcodes, the only catcodes remaining 
were M, and any C, F, or H EROs that deadlined a major end-item since these are the 
only types of EROs that cause equipment readiness to decrease.  This is important 
because, as you will see in Chapter VI, we analyze a readiness-to-cost ratio that seeks to 
determine how much we are spending to maintain a certain level of readiness.  Thus, we 
only need to consider deadlining catcodes. 
Once we were confident we had all the relevant catcodes captured, we had to 
consider the parts associated with the remaining EROs.  We must again make the point 
that because MIMMS is a very manually intensive process, it is prone to data entry 
errors.  One of the most common places to make mistakes is while entering the 13-digit 
National Stock Numbers (NSN) of the required parts needed to repair an item.  This is 
because the Equipment Repair Order Shopping List (EROSL) is handwritten by the 
mechanic, and then given to a supply clerk to keypunch into SASSY.  Since the mechanic 
doesn’t actually keypunch the information into SASSY, the supply clerk is occasionally 
unable to read the handwriting on the EROSL and subsequently enters the wrong part 
number.  This is the primary reason there is a weekly parts reconciliation conducted 
between supply and maintenance.  In the absence of time, we decided to remove all parts 
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from EROs that contained invalid NSNs.  An “invalid NSN” means that either the NSN 
was entered incorrectly or completely missing.  Incorrectly entered NSNs can come in a 
variety of forms, such as entering an NSN that is not associated with any part, including 
letters in the NSN instead of the required 13-digits, and entering something like LIMA 
COMPANY when the part was scrounged from another source of supply. 
The data cleansing tasks mentioned here were critical in order to properly perform 
our analysis.  Up to this point, any unit could have easily obtained this data by requesting 
it from LOGCOM or by using historical data dumps maintained by the unit.  However, in 
order to analyze the Affordability Index in Chapter V and to perform cost-to-readiness 
analyses, we need to include all parts costs associated with the NSNs in our remaining 
data, obviously, as well as the replacement cost of the major end-item, and the Functional 
Areas (FA) (Appendix B) to which each TAMCN belongs.  The parts costs and 
replacement costs were provided by LOGCOM are in 2003 dollars.   
  
D. ASSUMPTIONS 
We assume that EROs in the sample data were opened and maintained in 
accordance with all applicable policies and directives.  One of the major shortcomings of 
MIMMS is that it is easy to cover mistakes or to circumvent the supply system.  For 
example, it is possible for a motor transportation mechanic to have the parts for two or 
more MARES reportable, combat-deadlined vehicles ordered on the same ERO in order 
to skew overall vehicle readiness.  While the cost to repair the vehicles would not be 
affected, the readiness data would be based downward, which bias the cost-readiness 
data.  While bias may be presented in the sample data, we explicitly assume that the bias 
in the sample is representative of that in the population.   
We assume that validation of data entered into MIMMS is conducted between 
unit maintenance management clerks and the unit maintenance commodities on a regular 
basis in accordance with policy guidance to ensure that the deadline and repair statuses of 
all equipment are current and accurate.  The procedures for entering data into MIMMS 
are manually intensive and require continuous management attention to ensure the data 
entered into the system by the maintenance management clerks is accurate.  When 
operational tempo is high, maintenance management clerks routinely find themselves 
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falling behind in their data entry duties or may do their data entry in the evening after the 
daily MIMMS courier is sent.  If an item is repaired in two days, for example, and the 
clerk skips his data entry one day, he may not enter the item in the system as deadlined, 
and therefore, it wouldn’t be captured in our data.  He may justify this by reasoning that 
items deadlined for less than 24 hours are not required to be entered into MIMMS. 
We assume that the reconciliation of parts on order/cancelled is conducted 
between unit maintenance management clerks and the unit supply office in accordance 
with policy guidance.  Since MIMMS and SASSY are independent systems, maintenance 
management policy directs maintenance management personnel to conduct weekly 
reconciliation of the parts on order in MIMMS to the parts actually on order in SASSY.   
Without proper reconciliations, we cannot be sure that the cost data is accurate. 
Finally, we also assume that the total dollar value of all invalid NSNs removed 
during the data cleansing process discussed above were financially immaterial to the 
analysis.  
 
E. METHODOLOGY        
After cleansing the data, we analyzed the AI and readiness-to-cost models.  We 
performed the analysis of both models using Microsoft Excel.  The first step in this 
process is partitioning the readiness and MIMMS data for two functional areas (FA).  For 
this study, we chose FA 43-Artillery and FA 48-Anti-Armor Weapon Systems and Direct 
Support Equipment.  These two FAs were chosen because the equipment functionality of 
each item within the FA is very different, although the equipment within the FA function 
together to perform a particular mission.  For example, an M2A2 Aiming Circle is very 
different than a 155mm Howitzer, but they are both required for successful call-for-fire 
missions.  This is important to note because the underlying logic behind the AI is that 
items within a functional area have similar cost and readiness behavior.  Therefore, in 
order to confirm the basis of the AI model, the equipment within these FAs must have 
similar cost and readiness behavior.    
The next step is to group the cost data obtained from MIMMS by year, and then 
group the readiness data by year and MEF.  This enables us to calculate the total parts 
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costs for I and III MEFs, which is defined as Total Support Cost (TSC) in the AI model 
for each year.  For the purposes of this study, TSC will only include total combat 
deadlining parts costs.  Using the readiness data, we then calculate the average readiness 
(R), supply (S), materiel readiness (MR), quantity authorized, quantity possessed, and 
quantity deadlined for each MEF by year.  We use the yearly average for all readiness 
data because we are analyzing the total parts cost data by year.  Once all the readiness 
data is partitioned, we then sum the averages for I and III MEF by year for MR, quantity 
authorized, quantity possessed, and quantity deadlined, and then calculate the total 
average for each year.  This provides us with the ability to run the data through the AI 
model by having all of the variables organized in a manner that is easy to view.  Using 
the partitioned data, we then ran the AI model in order to perform our analysis.  The 
output obtained from this step is discussed in Chapter V.   
In Chapter VI, we analyze our recommendation for a readiness-to-cost model.  
Again, we used the same data for this model, i.e. from FAs 43 and 48 that we used for the 
analysis of the AI model.  The readiness-to-cost model is a graphical display that views 
the ratio of material readiness-to-cost.  The first step is to calculate the material 
readiness-to-cost ratio for each year.  Next, we plot MR, TSC, and material readiness-to-
cost.  Our initial output produced displays with sharp spikes that made readability and 
interpretation difficult.  In order to alleviate this problem, we apply data-smoothing to 
reduce the sharp spikes, which allow trends to surface.  The data is smoothed by first 
calculating a two-year moving average for MR and TSC, normalizing the data by taking 
the moving average for each year, and then dividing it by the total eight-year average for 
MR, and TSC respectively.   
Finally, the material readiness-to-cost ratio is calculated using the normalized 
values of MR and TSC.  We plotted the variables and determined that the output was less 
dynamic, but we still noticed outliers that detracted from conducting trend analysis.  
Therefore, we applied the square root to MR, TSC, and material readiness-to-cost in 
order to bring the data points closer together, but still allow us to view trends.  This is the 
form we used to conduct our analysis in Chapter VI.      
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V. ANALYSIS OF THE AFFORDABILITY INDEX MODEL  
A. MOTIVATION 
 To analyze the relationship between the cost and readiness of Marine Corps 
ground combat equipment, the Marine Corps Logistics Command (LOGCOM) created a 
model called the “Affordability Index.”  The model seeks to provide an empirically sound 
methodology for examining the impact of maintenance expenditures on the readiness of 
ground combat equipment.  In this chapter we explain and examine the Affordability 
Index (AI) model.  We first present an overview and discuss the properties of the model, 
including the theory and reasoning behind its structure.  Next we conduct analysis of the 
AI using historical cost and readiness data for two Functional Areas (FAs).  We then 
discuss the soundness and validity of the AI model based on our findings.  We conclude 
with insight on the application and implementation of the current model as a tool for 
allocation of scarce resources.  
 
B. OVERVIEW   
 The AI model is comprised of variables that are associated with current readiness 
reporting procedures.  The model is intended for use in evaluating ground combat 
equipment by TAMCN.  It is applicable only to the TAMCNs included in the Marine 
Corps Automated Readiness Evaluation System (MARES), as specified in MCO 
3000.11D and contained within McBul 300018 because these are the only items tracked in 
MIMMS for readiness reporting purposes.   
The impetus for the Affordability Index model was to accurately portray the cost 
and readiness relationship between equipment within a functional area to determine 
which items are performing outside the normal cost-to-readiness range within the 
functional area.  It was based on the assumption that equipment within a functional area 
have similar cost and readiness rates associate with them, and therefore, would have 
                                                 
18 MCO 3000.11D and MCBUL 3000, respectively, are the official publications 
governing the monitoring of ground equipment capability within the Marine Corps.  See 
Appendix B for a list of all MARES reportable items.  
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similar AI’s.  If an item has a low AI relative to the other items within that FA, then that 
item would require increased management attention.  Logically speaking, one would 
expect to find that changes in readiness can be attributed to the amount being spent on the 
maintenance and upkeep of the equipment included in the calculation of readiness.   
If structured correctly, the output of the AI model would highlight which items 
(TAMCNs) are not providing an adequate “return on investment” and direct 
commanders’ attention to items that may need to be replaced or managed more 
effectively.  Those items for which readiness is declining but cost is increasing, or where 
cost is increasing with no resultant rise in readiness, could be deemed “unaffordable” by 
commanders or budgeters.  The AI model is intended to analyze only one TAMCN at a 
time, although the output of all TAMCNs could be combined on a chart to provide a 
comprehensive picture of readiness.  Although the AI model is structured to analyze the 
affordability of a TAMCN over a fiscal year, the time and/or unit size can be tailored to 
meet a particular analyst’s needs.  
The AI model and variables are listed below: 
AI = 1- ________(TSC Active Fleet )________ 
               (Qty Active * Unit Price Escalated) / MR 
 
 Total Support Cost (TSC) is the dollar amount spent to support a particular 
TAMCN for a specified period of time, usually a fiscal year.  It does not include 
operating costs such as fuel, transportation, or operator labor cost.  Estimates of 
maintenance labor and overhead costs cannot be derived from the information in 
MIMMS.  Labor hours are supposed to be tracked in the header information for 
Equipment Repair Orders (ERO’s) but it is not consistently tracked.  It is generally 
missing completely or does not give an accurate account of labor hours.  The limited 
amount of information included in the ERO header is not useful and it is therefore 
excluded from TSC.  Although routine maintenance is a part of support costs, we 
included only the cost of combat deadlining parts as a proxy for Total Support Cost.  
“Combat deadline” refers to the status of the equipment.  It means the equipment is not 
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ready to be used in combat.  Because we are concerned with combat readiness, we 
exclude parts that cause a different kind of deadline—i.e. safety deadline.  For example, a 
HMMWV with a missing mirror is not combat deadlined, but a HMMWV that needs a 
new alternator is combat deadlined.  Parts ordered for routine maintenance do not 
negatively affect the readiness level of the equipment that is reported (combat readiness).  
Because the AI seeks to explain readiness as a function of cost, the only relevant costs are 
the costs of parts that have an impact on the readiness level.   
Quantity (Qty) is the number of the particular TAMCN possessed by the unit or 
units included in the formula.  Because the AI can be “scaled,” the number would change 
depending on the size or number of units included in the AI.  For example, if the I MEF 
Commanding General wanted to know the affordability of the ground combat equipment 
in I MEF, Qty would include only the total number for I MEF.  On the other hand, if 
Congress wanted an overview of affordability for the entire Marine Corps, Qty would 
include the total number possessed by all Marine Corps units.   
Unit Price is the original procurement price for the item, escalated to reflect 
current year dollars, and was obtained from LOGCOM.  Unit Price is included in the 
model to “normalize” the data.  It is based on the assumption that the ratio between TSC 
and Unit Price is similar for all TAMCNs and that annual support costs increase as a 
percentage of procurement price as the equipment ages.  If this assumption were correct, 
the inclusion of Unit Price in the model would help to smooth the output and make the AI 
more sensitive.  If annual support costs increase each year for all TAMCNs by a similar 
percentage of procurement cost, a greater rate of increase will indicate a problem.  It 
would effectively provide a means to compare unlike FAs.  If all TAMCNs and all FAs 
have similar relationships between TSC and UP, the model creates a basis for comparing 
unlike items.  By including Unit Price, if the underlying assumptions are correct, the AI 
formula will produce an output between zero and one.  However, if the assumptions are 
wrong, meaning that TSC does not increase each year as a percentage of UP, then the 
output of the AI will remain between zero and one with the results biased upward.   
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These underlying assumptions about Unit Price and its relationship to annual 
support costs do not prove true for actual data.  Tables 3 and 4 provide a summary of 
TSC, Unit Price, and the ratio TSC:UP for FA 43 and FA 48.  
 
Table 3.   Relationship Between TSC and UP for FA 43 (1996-1998)  
FA 43 
  1996 
  E0665 E1035 E1045 E1145 E1210 
TSC $1,519.00 $0.00 $162,458.88 $0.00 $0.00
UP $1,032,337.00 $0.00 $218,000.00 $0.00 $299,115.00
TSC/UP 0.02% 0.00% 69.33% 0.00% 0.00%
  1997 
TSC $4.42 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
UP $1,032,337.00 $0.00 $218,000.00 $0.00 $299,115.00
TSC/UP 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
  1998 
TSC $119.28 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
UP $1,032,337.00 $520,000.00 $218,000.00 $0.00 $299,115.00




Table 4.   Relationship Between TSC and UP for FA 48 (1996-1998) 
FA 48 
  1996 
  E0330 E0915 E0935 E1911 E1912 
TSC $654.00 $19.04 $23,460.00 $0.00 $1,422.00
UP $41,051.00 $7,833.00 $72,000.00 $8,994.00 $203,199.00
TSC/UP 1.59% 0.24% 32.58% 0.00% 0.71%
  1997 
TSC $3,923.00 $2.54 $29,157.00 $0.00 $1.31
UP $41,051.00 $7,833.00 $72,000.00 $8,994.00 $203,199.00
TSC/UP 9.56% 0.03% 40.50% 0.00% 0.00%
   
  1998 
TSC $3,459.02 $0.30 $34,144.10 $0.00 $0.00
UP $41,051.00 $7,833.00 $72,000.00 $8,994.00 $203,199.00
TSC/UP 8.43% 0.00% 47.42% 0.00% 0.00%
 
As you can see from Table 3 and Table 4, the ratio of TSC to UP fluctuates dramatically 
over a short three-year timeframe and varies greatly between TAMCNs, even within the 
same FA.  The assumption that TSC is a similar proportion of UP for all TAMCNs is 
incorrect.  The second assumption that TSC as a percentage of UP increases at a similar 
rate for all FAs is also incorrect.  Due to the faulty assumptions behind the inclusion of 
Unit Price, it should be removed from the model.  
Materiel readiness (MR) is a combination of Equipment (R) and Supply (S) 
readiness.  The formula for deriving MR is (Qty Possessed – Qty Deadlined) / Qty 
Authorized.  The on-hand and authorized quantities are obtained from SASSY; the 
deadlined quantity is from MIMMS.  Like “Qty” in the numerator of the AI model, the 
calculation of MR should be scaled to tailor the analysis to a particular unit size.  
The AI model is restricted to the active fleet for simplicity.  To be accurate and 
thorough, TSC and quantity would include reserve units, maintenance depots, and other 
units such as Blount Island Command, the unit responsible for the management of 
equipment in the Maritime Prepositioning Program.  These non-active units do not use 
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the same systems for tracking maintenance and supply functions as the systems used by 
the active fleet, making comparison of information extremely difficult. 19     
We limited our analysis to two FAs based on initial results from the model.  
While conducting early sensitivity analysis with FAs 43 and 48, we noted that the model 
displayed a high output due to the use of the variable UP.  We conducted further 
sensitivity analysis by increasing the amount of items deadlined within a TAMCN to see 
if the AI would go down.  From this analysis, we concluded that the AI was not 
responding to the amount of items in a deadlined status due to the use of UP.  We then 
concluded that if the model could accurately portray the true state of a systems readiness 
posture, then it would not be a good model to reflect the “affordability” of all MARES 
reportable TAMCNs.  We further restricted our analysis of FA 43 and 48 to IMEF and 
IIIMEF only.  Of the three active Marine Expeditionary Forces, the First and Third use 
SASSY and MIMMS (as explained in Chapter II); however, the Second MEF (IIMEF) 
uses ATLASS II+.  Because the MEFs use different systems, it is difficult to merge the 
data and use a single model.  For our analysis we used data from IMEF and IIIMEF only.   
The AI model is based on the hypothesis that systems within a functional area 
(FA) tend to have similar characteristics, such as mean time between failure and cost to 
repair.  The expected result is that the AI’s of all TAMCNs within a functional area will 
“cluster” around a particular value.  If this is true, the AI will “index” the functional area 
to a narrowly defined affordability range.  It accounts for the fact that some functional 
areas may have a higher or lower AI than others, depending on the type and costs of the 
equipment within the FA.  The index for each FA would determine the inherent 
affordability for the FA in general.  Once the AI cluster for each FA is established, the AI 
would identify items within the FA that required closer examination or effort to move 
them back toward the baseline for their FA.  Items that have a low AI, relative to their 
own FA, could be quickly identified by stakeholders as requiring management attention.  
It would allow time-constrained managers to sort through maintenance data quickly to 
establish effective maintenance and fiscal strategies.   
                                                 
19 This is another drawback to the current antiquated, stovepiped systems currently in 
use.  They limit the ability to conduct thorough analysis of total costs.  
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By using this formula, the analyst, in theory, could view a system or unit at the 
division level or higher, and make informed decisions about where to apply limited 
resources.  For example, if weapons systems within FA 43-Artillery have a baseline AI of 
85% with a standard deviation of 5%, then a TAMCN with an AI of 74% in that FA 
would be “flagged” as requiring management attention to determine the cause of the low 
AI.  The AI output itself does not explain the deviation but rather calls attention to the 
TAMCN as an outlier which requires further investigation to explain the status.  
Assuming the evidence shows that current readiness dollars are unable to support the 
desired level of readiness, the AI model would reflect a low “affordability” of 
maintenance for that particular TAMCN.  If the model is accurate, managers could then 
make decisions about whether to increase spending to bring the item closer to the 
baseline.    
This model does not provide a basis for comparison between functional areas 
because it is based on the assumption that each FA will have a different AI grouping.  
The TAMCNs within a functional area would only be compared to the other TAMCNs 
within the same functional area.  Comparison between FAs could only be made on the 
basis of how closely their TAMCNs are clustered around their baseline AI or how many 
TAMCNs are outside an acceptable range of deviation from the baseline.  The hypothesis 
is that a close group means all the TAMCNs are being managed effectively.    
In addition to the mathematical model, LOGCOM created a notional graphical 
depiction of the results based on the expectations about TAMCNs within a functional 
area having similar characteristics.  Figure 4 is based on the hypotheses and underlying 
assumptions about the model and does not reflect actual results.  The expected result is 
that each FA will have a cluster but that the clusters for each FA will be different.  The 
different sized dots are meant to display the amount of time each TAMCN has been at its 
current AI.  The larger dots represent TAMCNs whose AI has been at the current level 
for a longer period of time.  Smaller dots depict more recent changes. 
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 In this section we present our analysis of the AI model for FAs 43 and 48, 
Artillery and Anti-Armor Weapons Systems respectively.  We initially selected these two 
dissimilar FAs to examine the sensitivity of the model.  Based on this limited initial 
assessment, we discovered inherent flaws with the formula.  Rather than running the 
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model for all 24 functional areas, we used FA 43 and 48 to illustrate the fundamental 
problems with the model that render it invalid. 
  We deliberately chose dissimilar FAs to test the hypothesis that each FA will 
have a grouping with a different baseline.  We used eight years of data records from 
MIMMS and SASSY for the analysis of the AI model, obtained from LOGCOM.  Table 
5 and Table 6 present the output of the model in Excel format for functional areas FA 43 
(Artillery), and FA 48 (Anti Armor Weapons Systems and Direct Support Equipment) for 
fiscal years 1996-2003.  Figure 5 is the actual “bullseye” chart which illustrates the 
results.   
 The output of the AI model for FA 43 and FA 48 is provided on the following 
pages using historical data from MIMMS and SASSY for quantity possessed, authorized, 
and dead-lined: 
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Table 5.   AI Results for Functional Area 43-Artillery 
 1996 
 E0665 E1035 E1045 E1145 E1210 
TSC $792,282.17 $0.00 $2,232,712.65 $0.00 $71,026.48 
Qty 116 0 121 0 31 
UP $1,032,337.00 $0.00 $218,000.00 $0.00 $299,115.00 
Authorized 112 0 122 0 30 
Possessed 116 0 121 0 31 
Deadlined 8 0 5 0 2 
AI 0.99 0.00 0.91 0.00 0.99 
 1997 
 E0665 E1035 E1045 E1145 E1210 
TSC $226,729.16 $0.00 $1,664,413.83 $0.00 $347,661.02 
Qty 123 0 125 0 30 
UP $1,032,337.00 $0.00 $218,000.00 $0.00 $299,115.00 
Authorized 117 0 127 0 29 
Possessed 123 0 125 0 30 
Deadlined 11 0 3 0 1 
AI 1.00 0.00 0.94 0.00 0.96 
  1998 
 E0665 E1035 E1045 E1145 E1210 
TSC $478,357.99 $2,587.59 $2,317,801.54 $0.00 $9,132.26 
Qty 121 5 123 0 26 
UP $1,032,337.00 $520,000.00 $218,000.00 $0.00 $299,115.00 
Authorized 120 4 123 0 26 
Possessed 121 5 123 0 26 
Deadlined 14 1 7 0 2 
AI 1.00 1.00 0.91 0.00 1.00 
 1999 
 E0665 E1035 E1045 E1145 E1210 
TSC $427,783.66 $6,563.12 $1,941,652.73 $0.00 $168,832.10 
Qty 116 5 126 0 27 
UP $1,032,337.00 $520,000.00 $218,000.00 $0.00 $299,115.00 
Authorized 114 5 127 0 26 
Possessed 116 5 126 0 27 
Deadlined 17 1 6 0 4 







 E0665 E1035 E1045 E1145 E1210 
TSC $658,527.67 $1,088.42 $1,336,416.13 $105.14 $400,217.10 
Qty 122 6 133 35 31 
UP $1,032,337.00 $520,000.00 $218,000.00 $25,000.00 $299,115.00 
Authorized 122 6 135 35 30 
Possessed 122 6 133 35 31 
Deadlined 16 1 6 1 4 
AI 0.99 1.00 0.95 1.00 0.95 
 2001 
 E0665 E1035 E1045 E1145 E1210 
TSC $99,172.55 $4,854.46 $1,085,260.65 $984.45 $69,883.67 
Qty 125 6 136 41 31 
UP $1,032,337.00 $520,000.00 $218,000.00 $25,000.00 $299,115.00 
Authorized 123 6 141 41 31 
Possessed 123 6 136 41 31 
Deadlined 13 1 9 1 6 
AI 1.00 1.00 0.96 1.00 0.99 
 2002 
 E0665 E1035 E1045 E1145 E1210 
TSC $310,696.02 $3,997.19 $1,736,646.04 $1,652.24 $227,449.77 
Qty 121 8 134 43 33 
UP $1,032,337.00 $520,000.00 $218,000.00 $25,000.00 $299,115.00 
Authorized 120 8 135 43 33 
Possessed 121 8 134 43 33 
Deadlined 19 1 5 2 5 
AI 1.00 1.00 0.94 1.00 0.97 
 2003 
 E0665 E1035 E1045 E1145 E1210 
TSC $593,663.13 $1,746.82 $1,121,372.48 $9,861.00 $307,667.36 
Qty 131 5 124 42 30 
UP $1,032,337.00 $520,000.00 $218,000.00 $25,000.00 $299,115.00 
Authorized 129 6 130 42 31 
Possessed 131 5 124 42 30 
Deadlined 27 0 6 2 4 




Table 6.   AI Results for Functional Area 48-Anti Armor Weapons Systems 
 1996 
 E0330 E0915 E0935 E1911 E1912 
TSC $161,665.07 $69,747.13 $1,296,186.16 $529.00 $251,000.66 
Qty 277 421 290 37 45 
UP $41,051.00 $7,833.00 $72,000.00 $8,994.00 $203,199.00 
Authorized 284 371 289 49 41 
Possessed 277 421 290 37 45 
Deadlined 14.00 16.00 11.00 0.00 2.00 
AI 0.98 0.98 0.94 1.00 0.97 
 1997 
 E0330 E0915 E0935 E1911 E1912 
TSC $138,048.93 $58,281.73 $691,577.59 $711.19 $999,015.88 
Qty 279 412 283 48 46 
UP $41,051.00 $7,833.00 $72,000.00 $8,994.00 $203,199.00 
Authorized 285 397 282 52 45 
Possessed 279 412 283 48 46 
Deadlined 11.00 14.00 12.00 1.00 5.00 
AI 0.99 0.98 0.96 1.00 0.88 
 1998 
 E0330 E0915 E0935 E1911 E1912 
TSC $65,413.83 $37,570.03 $997,679.14 $746.00 $681,222.66 
Qty 232 371 256 44 39 
UP $41,051.00 $7,833.00 $72,000.00 $8,994.00 $203,199.00 
Authorized 209 369 206 45 32 
Possessed 232 371 256 44 39 
Deadlined 12.00 13.00 10.00 1.00 2.00 
AI 0.99 0.99 0.95 1.00 0.93 
 1999 
 E0330 E0915 E0935 E1911 E1912 
TSC $79,519.42 $126,788.00 $882,864.45 $186.70 $567,722.94 
Qty 177 375 188 48 33 
UP $41,051.00 $7,833.00 $72,000.00 $8,994.00 $203,199.00 
Authorized 182 376 183 49 31 
Possessed 177 375 188 48 33 
Deadlined 9.00 21.00 6.00 1.00 3.00 




 E0330 E0915 E0935 E1911 E1912 
TSC $182,685.22 $50,909.51 $770,970.07 $0.00 $279,731.31 
Qty 188 407 191 55 47 
UP $41,051.00 $7,833.00 $72,000.00 $8,994.00 $203,199.00 
Authorized 199 407 191 56 51 
Possessed 188 407 191 55 47 
Deadlined 11.00 10.00 10.00 0.00 3.00 
AI 0.97 0.98 0.94 1.00 0.97 
 2001 
 E0330 E0915 E0935 E1911 E1912 
TSC $68,415.85 $31,391.62 $530,528.50 $190,133.53 $3,080.76 
Qty 180 424 193 53 52 
UP $41,051.00 $7,833.00 $72,000.00 $8,994.00 $203,199.00 
Authorized 194 418 193 54 53 
Possessed 180 424 193 53 52 
Deadlined 15.00 9.00 11.00 0.00 2.00 
AI 0.99 0.99 0.96 0.59 1.00 
 2002 
 E0330 E0915 E0935 E1911 E1912 
TSC $36,012.31 $59,376.08 $593,109.43 $979.20 $695,226.38 
Qty 201 424 196 54 55 
UP $41,051.00 $7,833.00 $72,000.00 $8,994.00 $203,199.00 
Authorized 196 423 196 55 57 
Possessed 201 424 196 54 55 
Deadlined 14.00 17.00 15.00 1.00 5.00 
AI 1.00 0.98 0.95 1.00 0.93 
 2003 
 E0330 E0915 E0935 E1911 E1912 
TSC $241,472.76 $32,001.42 $1,146,514.80 $18.30 $607,063.86 
Qty 201 411 197 50 54 
UP $41,051.00 $7,833.00 $72,000.00 $8,994.00 $203,199.00 
Authorized 203 434 201 54 57 
Possessed 201 411 197 50 54 
Deadlined 14.00 15.00 13.00 0.00 3.00 
AI 0.97 0.99 0.91 1.00 0.94 
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From the output of the AI model for FA 43 and FA 48, we conclude that the 
model does not provide a useful correlation between maintenance spending and readiness 
level, nor does it provide evidence of a grouping of TAMCNs within a functional area.  
As seen in Figure 5, the AIs of all TAMCNs are close to one.  There is not enough 
variance in the output to draw useful conclusions.  The AI actually paints a false picture 
of affordability and is not a useful tool for commanders and budgeters to use for the 
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allocation of scarce resources.  That is to say commanders could be misled into making 
assumptions about the “affordability” of TAMCNs within an FA.   
The reason for this is the structure and underlying assumptions about the model, 
specifically due to the inclusion of Unit Price.  The output of the model is not sensitive to 
items that are deadlined, but rather is sensitive to differences between quantity authorized 
and possessed.  The expected relationship about readiness being a result of maintenance 
spending does not exist in this formula.  In fact, changes in readiness are not reflected in 
the output, making the result essentially worthless.  For example, a TAMCN that has an 
authorized and possessed quantity of 120 could have 118 items in a deadline status, and 
still have an AI above .90.  See Table 9.  For this reason, we feel that this model does not 
accurately portray what is happening to the TAMCN in the above example in the real 
world, nor does it represent what is happening within the FA.   










The problem is due to the inclusion of Unit Price (UP).  The rationale for 
including UP in the formula was to normalize the data, incorporating the ratio of annual 
support costs to procurement cost.  This was based on the false assumption that annual 
support costs for all items represent a similar fraction of the procurement price.  In 
reality, the ratio is not at all similar for the various TAMCNs. For example, in 1999, 
E0915 had annual support costs that were much higher than the original procurement 
price, 21 were deadlined, but the AI was still 0.95.  The conditions seem right for “more 
attention” in the sense that there are a relatively large proportion of deadlined items but 
the AI does not reflect it.   
 52
Furthermore, TSC varies greatly between TAMCNs, even within two functional 
areas.  Figure 6, below, displays TSC for all TAMCNs within FA 43 and 48.  Annual 
support cost for these items ranges from $18.00 to $1.5 million.  The range in values of 
TSC combined with varying procurement costs result in an inconsistent ratio that should 
not be included in the model.  The model does not reflect the range of TSC values 
because of the inclusion of UP. 
 
Figure 6.   TSC Values for all TAMCNs within FA 43 and FA 48 
 
 
 Another problem with the AI model is that MR has a very narrow range of 
values.  The objective of the model is to explain fluctuations in readiness level in terms of 
cost.  Readiness, however, does not change greatly over time or by TAMCN.  Figure 7 
displays MR for all TAMCNs within FA 43 and FA 48.  The values are all close to one.  
In order to more effectively depict changes in MR, the model must either be changed or 




Figure 7.   MR Values for all TAMCNs within FA 43 and FA 48 
 
 
  After computing and plotting the AI for all TAMCNs within FA 43 and FA 48 we 
concluded that the current model is invalid.  The model results in output that is close to 
one in all cases, does not depict changes in MR, and is not sensitive to changes in TSC.  
Although there are 24 functional areas for Marine Corps’ ground combat equipment, 
there is no reason to compute the AI for all of them.  Because the underlying hypothesis 
and assumptions about the model are unfounded for two unrelated FAs, the results of the 
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other FAs are irrelevant.  If the model does not provide accurate and useful output for 
every TAMCN and every FA then it is not a good model and should be discarded.  In the 
next section we review and critique each of the variables in the model to further explain 
the output for FA 43 and 48. 
 
E. VARIABLE ANALYSIS   
 In this section we review the variables within the AI model and offer explanations 
about their use based on our results.  We explained the assumptions and rationale for the 
model above, in section B, with actual output displayed in section C.  Because of the 
problems with the output, particularly that the AI is more sensitive to differences between 
quantity (authorized and possessed) than it is to deadlined items, we conducted further 
analysis of the variables themselves and their relationship to the other variables.   
 The correlation for the variables is as follows: 
Table 8.   Correlation Data for FA-43 
 
  TSC Qty UP Authorized Possessed Deadlined AI 
TSC 1       
Qty 0.733368 1      
UP -0.01684 0.483726 1     
Authorized 0.743423 0.99938 0.463907 1    
Possessed 0.734681 0.999984 0.482591 0.999399037 1   
Deadlined 0.250049 0.734464 0.773602 0.723337543 0.734094707 1  










Table 9.   Correlation Data for FA-48 
 
  TSC Qty UP Authorized Possessed Deadlined AI 
TSC 1       
Qty -0.09618 1      
UP 0.496356 -0.50104 1     
Authorized -0.11547 0.995388 -0.51068 1    
Possessed -0.09618 1 -0.50104 0.995388069 1   
Deadlined 0.053289 0.835641 -0.33201 0.83768252 0.83564106 1  
AI -0.33811 0.208636 -0.16371 0.213505804 0.208635676 0.183399702 1
 
If the AI formula was fundamentally sound, we would see a high correlation between the 
variables.  A high level of correlation between variables in a formula means that the 
variables are strongly related.  For variables that have strong correlation with each other, 
a change in one variable will affect the other.  In the case of the AI model, we would 
expect a similar level correlation between variables regardless of functional area.   
The relationship between the variables in the formula should remain stable, 
regardless of the functional area being analyzed.  As show in Tables 10 and 11, however, 
this is not the case.  Unit Price, for example, is negatively correlated with TSC in FA 43 
but positively correlated with TSC in FA 48.  A negative correlation, such as for FA 43, 
means that the variables move in opposite directions in relation to each other.  As UP 
increases, TSC decreases and vice versa: as TSC increases or decreases, UP responds in 
the same way.  A positive correlation, on the other hand, means that the variables tend to 
move in the same direction.  One of the assumptions that prompted the inclusion of UP in 
the model was that UP and TSC have a similar relationship across all FAs.  If this were 
true it would also mean that they were similarly correlated for all FAs.  We need look no 
further than these two FAs to see that this is not the case.     
 Due to the problems with correlation and mistaken assumptions about the 
relationship between procurement price and annual support costs, we conclude UP should 
be omitted from the model.  The variable UP represents the unit price or procurement 
cost of an end item for a particular TAMCN.  This number may be relatively large in 
comparison to the total support cost for its associated TAMCN.  For example, the 
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TAMCN E0665 within FA 43 has a TSC of $792,282.17, while the UP for that item is 
$1,032,337.00.  When the AI model is run, the UP is multiplied by the quantity of 
E0665’s within I and III MEF.  By doing so, the AI generates a very large number in 
comparison to TSC.  When placed within the AI model this produces a number close to 
one regardless of the number of items deadlined.  We therefore have to ask the question, 
what does the unit price tell us about the total support costs in relation to maintaining 
readiness?   
 Our conclusion is that the initial procurement price is a sunk cost that should not 
be incorporated into an analysis seeking to determine future allocation of resources.  It 
was initially included to produce an AI between zero and one, but the unexpected output 
sends us back to the drawing board for a more effective model.  In the next chapter we 
present a simple readiness-to-cost model and discuss its potential usefulness and 
applicability as a tool for allocation of maintenance spending.   
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VI. RECOMMENDATION FOR A READINESS –TO-COST 
MODEL 
A. MOTIVATION 
 As discussed in Chapter II, the Marine Corps is pursuing an enterprise level 
management tool for tracking maintenance and readiness known as MERIT.  MERIT 
allows MEF and Division commanders to view current and historical materiel readiness 
(MR) levels and analyze trends.  The AI model discussed in Chapter V was intended for 
use as a module within MERIT to augment the commanders’ ability to allocate scarce 
maintenance resources.  In that chapter, we concluded that the proposed AI model does 
not work as it was intended because of faulty assumptions and unstable relationships 
between the variables.  In this chapter, we explore a materiel readiness-to-cost model that 
could be incorporated into MERIT to fulfill the goals of the AI.  We begin with a 
conceptual overview of the readiness-to-cost model and present examples of existing 
tabular data fields within MERIT for material readiness ratings (MR).  Next, we discuss 
the potential applications of the readiness–to-cost model using graphical depictions of the 
data for the same functional areas we used for our analysis of the AI model.  We then 
conclude our analysis by providing ways in which this model can be improved in the 
future by including additional costs that have a significant impact on materiel readiness.       
 
B. OVERVIEW 
 The readiness-to-cost model presented in this chapter is intended to serve as an 
alternative approach to fulfill the intent of the AI model.  The basis for our 
recommendation is the belief that a simple readiness-to-cost model is sufficient enough to 
provide materiel readiness stakeholders with a useful tool for maximizing materiel 
readiness because it provides a degree of empirical analysis not currently available to 
them.  The model includes a graphical depiction of the relationship between materiel 
readiness (MR) and total support cost (TSC).  Rather than determining the “affordability” 
of an item, which is more important during the acquisition and replacement phases of the 
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equipment life cycle, the readiness-to-cost model is shown to be more beneficial to 
materiel readiness stakeholders because it focuses on equipment sustainability during the 
operational phase of the equipment life cycle.     
The readiness-to-cost model serves as a measure of the return-on-investment 
(ROI) from “investing” maintenance funds to sustain and improve materiel readiness.  
For example, commanders would use the model to improve the sustainability of ground 
combat principal end items (PEI’s) by analyzing trends and allocating maintenance funds 
based on which items are the best candidates for maintenance spending.  It is also useful 
as an explanatory tool for spikes or drops in spending.  Over the long term, the readiness-
to-cost model is an effective tool for examining the cyclical nature of maintenance 
spending.  Because the cyclical nature of maintenance spans many years, the scope of our 
current analysis is somewhat limited by the fact that our data set contains only eight years  
of maintenance and cost data.   
 Ideally, the readiness-to-cost model will be incorporated into MERIT.  As 
discussed in Chapter II, MERIT is extremely versatile and user-friendly.  It has many 
tools which may be tailored by materiel readiness stakeholders to analyze the current 
status and historical trends of maintenance and readiness levels.  Users can access tabular 
data fields, import the fields into Excel for ad hoc analysis, and view charts and graphs of 
readiness levels over time.  They can customize the output by unit as well as timeframe. 
The following figures, Figure 8 and Figure 9, are actual examples of output 
displays in MERIT.  They are included to illustrate the usability and visual nature of the 
output and are examples of the tabular data from MERIT.  Figure 8 depicts MR data and 
trend analysis for all M1A1 tanks in I MEF over the last 437 weeks.  Figure 9 is another 
example of tabular data that can be used to conduct trend analysis of material readiness 
rating (MR) for a specific period of time.  In this instance, the chart represents the same 
TAMCN and MEF as in Figure 8, but includes 52 weeks rather than 437 weeks of data.  
The result is a more detailed graph that reflects current trends.  
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 A(+/-) line indicating three standard deviations from the historical mean MR rating.  
 B(+/-) line indicating two standard deviations from the historical mean MR rating.  
 C(+/-) line indicating one standard deviation from the historical mean MR rating.  
 The historical mean MR rating. 
 The MR trend line for the most recent 437 weeks. 
 
Rule 1 Detection: Occurs when a point exceeds the control limit of three standard deviations from the mean (A). 
Also known as an extreme outlier.  
 
Rule 2 Detection: Occurs when 2 out of 3 consecutive points are beyond two standard deviations from the mean 
(B) and are on the same side of the mean.  
 
Rule 3 Detection: Occurs when 4 out of 5 consecutive points are beyond one standard deviation from the mean (C) 
and are on the same side of the mean.  
 Rule 4 Detection: Occurs when 8 consecutive points lie on the same side of the mean.  
 Rule 5 Detection: Occurs when 8 consecutive points increase in value or decrease in value.  
 Rule 6 Detection: Occurs when 13 consecutive points lie within one standard deviation of the mean.  
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 A(+/-) line indicating three standard deviations from the historical mean MR rating.  
 B(+/-) line indicating two standard deviations from the historical mean MR rating.  
 C(+/-) line indicating one standard deviation from the historical mean MR rating.  
 The historical mean MR rating. 
 The MR trend line for the most recent 52 weeks. 
 
Rule 1 Detection: Occurs when a point exceeds the control limit of three standard 
deviations from the mean (A). Also known as an extreme outlier.  
 
Rule 2 Detection: Occurs when 2 out of 3 consecutive points are beyond two standard 
deviations from the mean (B) and are on the same side of the mean.  
 
Rule 3 Detection: Occurs when 4 out of 5 consecutive points are beyond one standard 
deviation from the mean (C) and are on the same side of the mean.  
 Rule 4 Detection: Occurs when 8 consecutive points lie on the same side of the mean.  
 
Rule 5 Detection: Occurs when 8 consecutive points increase in value or decrease in 
value.  
 
Rule 6 Detection: Occurs when 13 consecutive points lie within one standard deviation of 
the mean.  
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The metrics listed in Figure 8 and Figure 9 utilize the mean and standard 
deviation of materiel readiness data.  We conclude from applying the metrics in Figure 9 
that the points above and below the mean are not just isolated events.  This is particularly 
useful for maintenance planning, because we can look at trends over time and ask why 
the MR was behaving in a particular way.  In doing so, we may find, for example, that 
units were deployed, training, or in garrison.  The ability to view the behavior of MR 
during these scenarios can aid in the maintenance planning for units that will be using 
that system in a similar manner and environment. 
The readiness-to-cost model can eventually be incorporated into MERIT and 
displayed in similar tabular data fields to show trends over time.  In addition to viewing 
readiness-to-cost over time, similar metrics as those for MR trend analysis as described 
above in Figure 8 and Figure 9 could be applied, and analyzed in a similar manner.  In the 
next section we describe the readiness-to-cost model and provide specific examples of its 
applicability to materiel readiness analysis.  
 
C. ANALYSIS OF READINESS-TO-COST MODEL 
As more and more data becomes available, the output of the readiness-to-cost 
model will become more useful and valuable.  By examining long-term, analysts will be 
able to view the cyclical nature of equipment readiness and maintenance spending.  More 
data will also facilitate studies on the mean time between failure (MTBF) of systems.  
Analyzing MTBF shows the actual availability and reliability of systems rather than what 
they were predicted to be during the acquisition process.  MTBF studies also provide a 
heuristic for whether or not we got what we paid for when we purchased the item.  ROI 
and MTBF studies are useful for determining which systems to enter into service life 
extension programs (SLEP), initiating contractor bids for replacement systems, or 
establishing performance based logistics (PBL) contracts for intermediate and depot level 
maintenance.    
 The readiness-to-cost model provides a visual display of readiness-to-cost for a 
particular TAMCN over a period of time.  Analyzing data over a long period of time 
yields more useful results than shorter time spans, particularly in conducting trend 
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analysis.  Eight years is a relatively short timeframe when considering the overall life of 
most weapons systems.  By looking at only eight years of data, our results are quite 
erratic and require further refinement to increase their usability.  The initial output of 
readiness-to-cost had extreme variability.  The impetus of the readiness-to-cost model is 
to provide a quick, visual map of problem areas.  Extreme deviations should be the 
exception rather than the rule if the model is to be useful as a quick visual reference.  To 
achieve more user-friendly results, we had to eliminate some of the extreme variability in 
the graphs.   
To “smooth” the data and make it easier to identify areas of concern, we first 
calculated the average values of MR and TSC over the eight year time period.  We then 
calculated a two-year moving average and normalized the results with the eight year 
average.  The result was a much smaller range of output, but it needed another minor 
refinement to be more visually appealing and easily readable.  We then calculated 
readiness-to-cost using the normalized figures.  To narrow the range of values even 
further, we calculated the square root for the normalized MR, TSC, and readiness-to-cost.  
The result was a visual display that enabled easier identification of areas of concern than 
the initial non-normalized display.               
 The following figures are actual results from the normalized readiness-to-cost 
model.  They reflect a sampling of TAMCNs from several FAs.  The output is not a 
purely quantifiable measure of affordability or return-on-investment, but it does provide a 
systematic and consistent means of analyzing trends.  Rather than determining the 
affordability of an item, the readiness-to-cost output is used as an indicator for areas of 
concern that require further research or management attention.  In the interest of 
sustaining ground combat equipment that is already in use, the readiness-to-cost model 
creates a record of performance and a roadmap for change.   
 The following figures graphically display the output from the readiness-to-cost 
model.  In addition to displaying readiness-to-cost, we also display MR, TSC, and the 
linear trend line for readiness-to-cost.  Once we prepared the charts, we asked ourselves 
the question:  “What do these graphs tell us about the return-on-investment of 
maintenance spending?” 
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Figure 10.   Readiness-to-cost output for A1935: MRC-138B 
 



























Figure 11.   Readiness-to-cost output for B0921: Generator Set MEP-813A/805A 
 
 
























Figure 12.   Readiness-to-cost output for D1125: HMMWV TOW Carrier 
 























Figure 13.   Readiness-to-cost output for D1059: 5-ton Cargo Truck 6x6 
 

























Figure 14.   Readiness-to-cost output for E0935: M220E4 TOW 
 






















Figure 15.   Readiness-to-cost output for AN/UAS-12A/C Night Vision Equipment Set 


























Figure 16.   Readiness-to-cost output for E1911: AN/TSM-152 Missile Guidance Test Set 























 We also scrutinized the MR and TSC lines.  In all cases, the MR remained very 
stable-- regardless of the readiness-to-cost and TSC lines.  In some cases, the MR was 
greater than one, meaning a unit has materiel readiness greater than 100%.  This can only 
occur when a unit has excess equipment in its inventory.  Although MR is a commanders 
“go to war” capability, we are looking for the direct effect of maintenance spending on an 
item’s readiness level. MR is not restricted to values between zero and one because it 
includes Quantity Possessed and Quantity Authorized.  If units have more items on hand 
than they are authorized, their MR increases.  The result is the incentive to hold excess 
equipment.  The result may or may not be higher spending for maintenance, but it creates 
the possible problem of artificially inflated or artificially stabilized MR levels.  
 The problem of sable MR levels remains.  That is, why is MR almost always 
constant when readiness-to-cost is relatively low and high?  It is because MR is not 
sensitive to changes in spending.  It stays within a small range regardless of the spending 
level.  Perhaps our proxy measure of TSC, deadlining parts cost, does not present a useful 
measure of maintenance costs.   Perhaps MR is not a good measure of return-on-
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investment of maintenance spending because of the inclusion of Quantity Possessed and 
Quantity Authorized.  We conclude that the readiness-to-cost model requires further 
refinement before it can be incorporated into MERIT as a resource allocation tool.  In the 
next section we present further analysis of the readiness-to-cost model by addressing the 
problem of incomplete cost data and explore the alternative of using R rather than MR as 
a measure of material readiness. 
 
D.  REFINEMENT OF READINESS-TO-COST MODEL 
In the previous section we examined the output from a basic readiness-to-cost 
model and discovered questions about its structure.  In this section we examine the effect 
of replacing MR with R in the readiness-to-cost model.  This improvement is required to 
answer the question about the sensitivity of readiness to spending levels.  We present 
graphical outputs of readiness (R) to cost as an alternative to MR and analyze their 
usefulness.   
  The AI model used MR to reflect materiel readiness.  In Chapter V, we 
defined MR in terms of the variables: (Quantity Possessed – Quantity Deadlined) / 
Quantity Authorized.  In reality, using MR as a metric for readiness rewards commanders 
for holding excess items.  This results in an upward bias of the true maintenance 
readiness.  To be consistent with the AI, we used MR in the readiness-to-cost model.  
Rather than using MR, we believe R may be a more effective measure of readiness 
because it does not include the upward bias associated with Quantity Possessed and 
Quantity Authorized.  Our contention is that using R would present a more accurate 
depiction of a systems’ readiness posture.   
Figure 17 depicts the R-to-cost versus the MR-to-cost of a system.  We selected 
E1035, Meteorological Station Group, to test the effect of using R because it had an MR 
greater than one during the first year.  We used the same data normalization methods that 
we used for the graph in the previous section in order to ensure an accurate comparison.  
Of particular interest in this display is the difference in MR and R.  MR decreases into 
steady state while R increases only slightly into steady state.  Any decrease in readiness 
reporting may lead commanders into believing that they have lost capability.  When we 
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report R, this statement is true.  However, when we report MR, this statement may not be 
true.  In Figure 17 we see that the true system readiness is nearly at 100%.  If the 
commander had viewed his true readiness using MR, he would have falsely assumed that 
he had a degraded readiness posture.  Additionally, the use of MR caused a greater spike 
in readiness-to-cost vice the true readiness-to-cost ratio that exists when we use R. 
 
Figure 17.   R vs. MR for E1035: Meteorological Station Group 





















The line for R is somewhat more sensitive than MR but is still relatively stable.  
Like MR, R is not particularly sensitive to changes in spending.  The output of this 
second readiness-to-cost model provides a means of viewing changes in cost and changes 
in readiness but does not explain changes in readiness as a function of cost.  We cannot 
establish a causal relationship between the minor fluctuations in readiness and the large 
variation in cost.  
After determining that using R in place of MR in a readiness-to-cost model still 
does not provide an effective tool for analyzing the relationship between cost and 
readiness in the interest of allocating maintenance resources, we reviewed what 
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comprises cost.  We are only using repair parts costs for this analysis, but there are other 
costs that must be captured to accurately reflect total support cost.  In the next section we 
provide recommendations for the future development of a cost analysis model.   
 
 
E.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE APPLICATIONS 
The motivation to create the Affordability Index and the readiness-to-cost model 
is to establish a quantifiable measure of how well systems are performing.  Immense 
effort goes into the acquisition, testing and evaluation, and fielding of equipment, but 
materiel readiness managers are still required to measure and evaluate the performance of 
existing equipment.  The AI and the readiness-to-cost model are attempts to provide a 
solution by examining the direct relationship between cost and readiness.  In reality, 
readiness levels do not fluctuate a great deal.  As systems age, their readiness is 
preserved, perhaps not by more parts but by longer hours and more effort on the part of 
the mechanics.   
In either case, it is difficult to isolate one particular variable that is driving 
readiness levels.  Rather than examining readiness as a measure of effectiveness of 
equipment, perhaps we should limit our analysis solely to cost.  In keeping with the spirit 
of the Affordability Index, commanders could examine items with rising cost to evaluate 
their current and future affordability.  They could drill down further to analyze the cost 
behavior of system components and replacement parts to determine what are the actual 
cost drivers within existing and aging systems.  
   What does a spike in repair parts costs tell us?  Ideally we would have accurate 
and complete information about all the cost drivers to compile an accurate and complete 
measure of TSC.  In reality, however, we do not have accurate and complete information, 
which is why we used deadlining parts cost as a proxy for TSC.  By continuing to use 
deadlining parts cost, we offer that we can use the spikes in TSC to evaluate the MTBF of 
systems by drilling down the repair parts costs.  We constructed a pivot table for the 
severe spike in TSC in Figure 17.  We asked ourselves whether there were many parts 
that broke, or a single part that broke repeatedly to drive the cost.  Table 10 is a pivot 
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table that answers this question.  From this table, we can see that there were two repair 
parts that cost approximately $190,000, and made up 99% of the repair parts cost for the 
duration of the spike in TSC from 2001 – 2002.   
Table 10.   Pivot table output: cost summary for E1035: Meteorological Station Group 
    
PART NAME PARTS CHARGE QUANTITY REQUIRED % OF PARTS COST 
CASE,FIELD 214.98 1 0.11% 
COVER,ELEC 6.04 1 0.00% 
EYESHIELD, 34.28 1 0.02% 
FUSE,CARTR 0.34 1 0.00% 
LAMP,CARTR 13.17 3 0.01% 
LIGHT,INDI 11.22 3 0.01% 
MISSILE GU 30,597 1 16.01% 
POWER SUPP 527.51 1 0.28% 
PROPELLER 214 1 0.11% 
SWITCH,TOG 13.63 1 0.01% 
TEST CONTR 159,312 1 83.36% 
WIRED HOUS 168.56 1 0.09% 
Grand Total $191112.73 16 100% 
 
 
We see the potential that our model has, and we show the reader in Figure 18 
using actual readiness data, and notional cost data how our model can be used in MERIT.  
Figure 18 displays 12 week observation of readiness data, and notional cost data for an 
AN/UAS 12 A/C Night Vision Equipment Set (E0330) within FA 48.  We broke the data 
down into weekly segments in order to get a more detailed view of how readiness-to-cost 









When we apply the rules that currently exist in MERIT, we can see that this 
system is relatively stable for this 12 week period.  Ideally, readiness-to-cost would be 
applied within MERIT in a manner similar to this.  We could also use pivot tables to drill 
down and inquire about spikes.  We showed how this could be accomplished in Figure 
18.  This may provide us with part of the explanation about the spike in readiness-to-cost.  
There may also be other factors that adversely affect cost that we are not capturing in this 
model.  We mentioned in the analysis that parts cost may not be an adequate 
representation of total support cost.  There are other costs that need to be captured in 
order to represent the full spectrum of TSC.  Costs such as labor hours, shop overhead for 
all three levels of maintenance, transportation costs associated with sending systems and 
components to higher levels of maintenance need to be captured.  When combined, these 
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costs have been shown to effect maintenance planning for organizations such as 
NAVAIR.  We have studied the maintenance costs and logistic strategy of NAVAIR in 
our Logistics Strategy course.  This has provided us with an insight into capturing the 
true TSC ground combat equipment.  We believe that if we can view the costs associated 
with these areas, we can improve the overall maintenance cycle and readiness of our 
systems.   
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
A. MOTIVATION 
 The time for developing a tool to track the maintenance costs associated with 
material readiness is at hand.  As our current inventory of ground combat equipment 
continues to age, and as new and more technologically sophisticated systems are 
acquired, we need to know how much it costs to maintain material readiness in order to 
budget maintenance funds and apply scarce maintenance resources.  Such a tool must be 
developed now in anticipation of ever-shrinking budgets and scarce resources.  The 
Secretary of Defense has established a culture of transformation for the military, one in 
which we take advantage of best business practices and streamline our operations by 
performing functions such as maintenance more efficiently.    
One proposed method of analyzing the relationship between cost and readiness is the 
Affordability Index model developed by Marine Corps Logistics Command (LOGCOM).  
The purpose of this project was to analyze the AI model and to provide an alternative 
proposed method of analyzing cost and readiness. This chapter begins with an overview 
of our project.  We first provide the reasons why the Marine Corps needs a tool such as 
the AI.  Next we summarize our research and highlight our findings on the analysis of the 
AI and readiness-to-cost models.  Finally we conclude with a recommendation for further 
development of the readiness-to-cost model as an alternative solution to the AI model and 
as a proposed module in MERIT.  
 
B. OVERVIEW  
The Marine Corps lacks a tool that links maintenance costs to the material 
readiness of ground combat equipment.  Our research commenced with the introduction 
of the Affordability Index model developed by LOGCOM.  Our analysis of the AI started 
with a review of the Marine Corps current practice of tracking maintenance costs and 
material readiness.  The current practice of tracking material readiness is decentralized 
and uses various unrelated IT systems.  MERIT incorporates the maintenance data from 
the legacy systems but does not provide accurate or complete cost data.  It also lacks a 
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means of linking cost and readiness.  The current practice for tracking support costs is 
disjointed and antiquated.  As detailed in Chapter II, the Marine Corps uses MIMMS and 
SASSY to track all maintenance records and costs, which lack sufficient information for 
calculating components such as labor cost, facilities costs, and overhead.  Support costs 
beyond those associated with repair parts are not accurately captured or reported.   
   To conduct an analysis of the AI, we ran the model with data pertaining to both 
maintenance and materiel readiness.  We used eight years of historical data that were 
obtained from MIMMS and SASSY.  Our first task was to cleanse the data and mold it 
into a useable form that could be run through the AI model.  We set out on this task by 
developing heuristics to reduce the size of the data sets and by applying current rules for 
reporting the MR of MARES items.  Once all of the data were inputted into the model, 
we were able to view the results and make conclusions and inferences about the 
usefulness of the AI.  The first observation that we made was that the AI did not behave 
as LOGCOM had intended it to.  For example, the AI was supposed to work on a scale 
between zero and one with one being the best outcome.  Our tests produced results that 
were close to one for almost all of the items that we ran through the model.   
Further analysis revealed that the AI was not sensitive to deadlined items, but that 
it was more sensitive to differences in the quantities of items authorized and possessed.  
We concluded that the AI would paint a false picture of affordability, because its design 
had the potential to mislead commanders about the true state of their equipment.  We 
provided an example of this type of error in Chapter V.  We determined that this was a 
result of the insensitive nature of the model.  The use of the variable UP biased the results 
upward for all of the TAMCNs that we analyzed.  We concluded that this state exists 
because of the magnitude of UP multiplied by quantity of the active fleet in comparison 
to TSC.  We concluded chapter V with a recommendation to analyze a readiness-to-cost 
model. 
 We initiated our recommendation for a readiness-to-cost model in Chapter VI first 
by using the existing variables of MR and TSC from the AI model.  We used MR and 
TSC to calculate readiness-to-cost, and present a graphical display.  Our motivation for 
using a graphical portrayal of readiness-to-cost was to satisfy the end-state of the AI 
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model by showing ROI, and to provide a useful tool to maintainers and commanders that 
would enable them to improve system sustainability.  Our initial results prompted us to 
study the use of readiness (R) vice MR.  The impetus to use R was primarily based on the 
fact that MR reflects supply data and rewards commanders with higher readiness levels if 
they possess excess systems.  We concluded that by using R we can portray a more 
accurate representation of maintenance costs and the resultant level of equipment 
readiness.  In addition to using R, we determined that the variable TSC was not a good 
indicator of total support costs.  We concluded Chapter VI with recommendations for 
further study on this variable and on improving the readiness-to-cost model. 
 
C.  AREAS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
 In its present form, the readiness-to-cost model presents only systems readiness 
and maintenance repair parts cost data.  In order to accurately portray support cost, 
continued study needs to be done on how the Marine Corps can best capture all the 
elements of support cost.  We have recognized that by introducing a more robust cost 
variable into this model, stakeholders will be able to make better improvements on 
maintenance spending and readiness.  Perhaps a complete analysis of cost cannot be 
incorporated until new systems are fielded.  
 In Chapter VI we noted that the readiness-to-cost model could and should be 
incorporated into MERIT.  This endeavor could be greatly assisted with the efforts of 
students enrolled in the Information Technology Management (ITM) curriculum in 
conjunction with LOGCOM.  In doing so, the model could be constructed to enable drill 
down analysis that is tailored to the users needs and be aligned with the current 
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APPENDIX A: LIST OF ACRONYMS/ABBREVIATIONS 
 
ATLASSII+: Asset Tracking for Logistics and Supply System, Phase II Plus  
Cat: Maintenance Category Code 
ERO: Equipment Repair Order 
FMF: Fleet Marine Force 
LOGCOM: Logistics Command 
MARES: Marine Corps Automated Readiness Evaluation System 
McBul: Marine Corps Bulletin 
MCO: Marine Corps Order 
MEF: Marine Expeditionary Force 
MIMMS: Marine Corps Integrated Maintenance Management System 
NSN: National Stock Number 
SECREP: Secondary Reparable 
SL-3 Shopping List-3 
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APPENDIX B: MARES REPORTABLE TAMCNS 
TAMCN FA Item 
A0010  13 Air Mobile, DASC, AN/UYQ-3A(V)2 
A0011 13 Fire Support Command & Control System (FSCCS), AN/UYK-102 (V)1 
A0013  13 Theater Battle Management Core System AN/TYY-2 
A0021  13 Multi-Source Correlations System, AN/TYQ-101 
A0025  13 Communications Platform, Air Defense (ADCP) 
A0248  11 Central Office, Telephone Automatic, AN/TTC-42(V) 
A0274  10 Communications Central, AN/TSC-120 
A0283  19 Team Portable Communications System, AN/PSQ-9 
A0412  19 Communications Jamming System, AN/ULQ-19(V)1 
A0465  14 Decoder Group, AN/UPA-60(V)2 
A0499  11 Digital Technical Control (DTC) Facility AN/TSQ-227 
A0655  10 Satellite Communications Terminal, AN/TSC-96A 
A0812  10 Ground Mobile Force Satellite Communications Terminal, AN/TSC-85A/B 
A0814  10 Communications Terminal, AN/TSC-93B(V)1 
A0821  13 Communications Central, Air Support (CASC), AN/TSQ-207 
A0873  13 Intel OPS (IOS-INTEL) Server AN/UYQ 91(V) 2 
A0881  14 Interrogator Set, AN/UPX-27 
A0918  10 Radio Set, Satellite, Tactical, Portable, AN/PSC-5 
A0966  19 Mobile EW Support System, AN/MLQ-36 
A1010  19 MEF Intel Analysis Suite, AN/MYQ-7 
A1219  19 Radio Recon, SS-2 
A1221  18 Monitor, Portable, AN/USQ-121 
A1310  10 Quick Reaction Satellite Antenna, OE-361G(V)2 
A1410  14 Radar Set, Acquisition, Continuous Wave, (CWAR) 
A1440  14 Radar Set, Fire Finder, AN/TPQ-36(V)5 
A1500  14 Radar Set, AN/TPS-63B  
A1503  14 Radar Set, LW3D, AN/TPS-59(V)(3) 
A1520  19 Radar System Attack Target JT, AN/TSQ-179B(V)2 
A1530  16 Multifunctional Radar Transponder Beacon, AN/PPN-19(V)2 
A1795  10 Radio Set, AN/GRC-193B(V)  
A1818  10 Radio Set, AN/GRC-171B(V)4 
A1935  10 Radio Set, MRC-138B(V)  
A1954  10 Radio Terminal Set, AN/MRC-142B 
A1955  10 Radio Terminal Set, AN/MRC-142  
A1957 10 Radio Set, AN/MRC-145A  
A2042  10 High Frequency Manpack Radio AN/PRC-138, AN/PRC-150 
A2065  10 Radio Set, AN/PRC-104B(V)  
A2069  10 Radio Set, AN/PRC-113(V)3 
A2070  50 Radio Set, Manpack, AN/PRC-119/A 
A2073  50 Radio Set, Manpack, AN/PRC-119D 
A2074  50 Radio Set, Vehicular AN/VRC-88D 
A2075  50 Radio Set, Vehicular AN/VRC-89D 
A2076  10 Radio Set, Vehicular AN/VRC-90D 
A2077  10 Radio Set, Vehicular AN/VRC-91D 
A2078  10 Radio Set, Vehicular AN/VRC-92D 
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A2079  10 Radio Set, Manpack, AN/PRC-119F 
A2164  10 Radio Set, Vehicular, AN/VRC-83(V)2 
A2167  50 Radio Set, Vehicular AN/VRC-88 
A2168  50 Radio Set, Vehicular AN/VRC-89 
A2169  10 Radio Set, Vehicular AN/VRC-90 
A2170  10 Radio Set, Vehicular AN/VRC-91 
A2171  10 Radio Set, Vehicular AN/VRC-92 
A2179  10 Radio Terminal Digital, Troposcatter, AN/TRC-170 
A2296  18 Relay Assembly, RE1162/U 
A2306  18 Sensor System, Monitor, Mobile, AN/MSC-77 
A2390  13 Sector Anti-Air Warfare FAC, AN/TYQ-87 
A2505  11 Switchboard, Telephone, SB-3614(V)/TT 
A2525  13 Tactical Air Operations Module, (TAOM), AN/TYQ-23 
A2535  19 Tactical (Gateway ) Data Network AN/TSQ-222 
A2537  19 Tactical Electronics Reconnaissance Processing and Evaluation System, AN/TSQ-90E 
A2542  13 Advance Field Artillery, Tactical Data System (Mobile) AN/GYK47(V)6 
A2545  13 Advance Field Artillery, Tactical Data System (Mobile) AN/GYK47(V)7 
A2551  19 Tactical Command System, AN/USC-55A 
A2629  19 Tactical Control and Analysis Center (TAC-PIP) AN/MYQ-8 
A2634  19 Tactical Control Analysis Center, Remote, AN/UYQ-83 
A3235  18 Communications Central, AN/TSQ190(V)2 
A3255  18 Sensor, Ground Unattended, AN/GSQ-257 
A3270  13 Communications Interface System, AN/MRQ-12 
A8018  97 Interrogator Computer, TSEC/KIR-1C 
A8019  97 Transponder Computer, TSEC/Kit-1C 
A8032  97 Speech Security Equipment, TSEC/KY-58 
A8038  97 Electronic Key Generator, TSEC/KG-40A/P 
A8100  10 Control Group, Radio, OK648/U 
B0001  21 Air-Conditioner 60Hz, 9,000 Btu 
B0002  21 Air-Conditioner 60Hz, 18,000 Btu, F18H-38A 
B0007  21 Air-Conditioner MCS Vertical 60K, Btu, FOOT-2HS 
B0011  21 Air-Conditioner A/E 32C-39, 18K Btu 
B0012  21 Air Conditioner, F18T-MPI, 60/400Hz, 18 Btu 
B0114  29 Boat, Bridge Erection, USCSBMK2  
B0120 29 Bridges, Erection Set, (MGB) N3250 MGB 
B0152  29 Bridge, Medium Girder (MGB), Dry Gap 
B0155  29 Bridge, Floating Ribbon, 70-Ton 
B0391 26 Container Handler, Rough Terrain, 50,000 lb, 988B 
B0443  26 Crane, High Speed, High Mobility, HSHMC 
B0446  26 Crane, Rough Terrain, Hydraulic, Light 
B0589  23 Excavator Combat, M9 ACE  
B0675  29 Fuel Dispensing System, Tactical, Airfield, M1966 
B0685  29 Fuel System Amphibious Assault, M69HC 
B0730  20 Generator Set, 3 kW, 60 Hz, Skid Mounted, MEP-061B 
B0891  20 Generator Set, 10 kW, 60 Hz, Skid Mounted, MEP-003A/803A 
B0921  20 Generator Set, Tact Quiet, 10 kW, 400 Hz, MEP-813A/805A 
B0953  20 Generator Set, 30 kW, 60 Hz, Skid Mounted, MEP-005A/805A 
B0971  20 Generator Set, 30 kW, 400 Hz, Skid Mounted, MEP-114A/815A 
B1016  20 Generator Set, Tact Quiet, 60 kW, 400 Hz, MEP-115A/816A 
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B1021  20 Generator Set, 60 kW, 60 Hz, Skid Mounted, MEP-006A/806A 
B1045  20 Generator Set, 100 kW, 60 Hz, Skid Mounted, MEP-007A/007B 
B1046  20 Generator Set, 100 kW, 60 Hz, Skid Mounted, MEP-007C 
B1082  23 Grader, Road, Motorized, 130-G  
B1135  29 Helicopter Expedient, Refueling System (HERS) 
B1291  99 Light Weight Decontamination System, M1731 
B1298  29 Line Charge Launch Kit, Trl Mtd, 01365 
B1315  29 Mine Clearing Launcher, MK-154, MOD 0 MK-154 
B1580  29 Fuel Pump Module (SIXCON) 
B1780  46 Riverine Assault Craft (RAC) System 
B1922  23 Scraper-Tractor, Wheeled, 621B 
B2085  29 Storage, Tank, Module, Fuel (SIXCON) 
B2127  29 Sweeper, Runway, Vacuum, 600  
B2460  23 Tractor, Full-Tracked, W/Angle Blade, T-5 
B2462  23 Tractor, Medium, Full-Tracked D7G, Caterpillar 
B2482  23 Tractor, All Wheel Drive w/Attachments FLU-419 
B2561  26 Truck, Forklift, Extended Boom 
B2566  26 Truck, Forklift, Rough Terrain, 4,000 lb 
B2567  23 Tractor, AT, Articulated Steering, 644E 
B2604  29 Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit (ROWPU) 
B2685  29 Welding Machine, ARC, Trl-Mtd DCC353P 
C2282  99 NBC Reconnaissance System (FOX) M93 
DO198  30 TRK, Cargo, 7-Ton, w/Winch (MTVR) MK23/MK25 
D0209  30 Power Unit, Front, 4x4, 12 1/2 –Ton , MK 48, Mod 0 
D0210  30 Truck, Aviation Refueler Capability (ARC) 2000 4900 6x4 
D0215  35 Semi- Trailer, 5,000 Gal Refueler 4x4, Bulk Fuel and Fuel Servicing, M970 
D0235  35 Semi- Trailer, 40-Ton Low-Bed, 12- Wheel, M870 
D0876  35 Trailer, Powered, Container Hauler 4x4, 22 1/2-Ton, MK14 
D0877  35 Trailer, Powered, Wrecker/Recovery 4x4, MK15, Mod 0 
D0878  35 Trailer, Powered, 5th Wheel 4x4, Semi-Trl, MK16, Mod 0 
D0879  35 Trailer, Powered, 20-Ton Dropside Cargo w/Crane 4x4, MK17, Mod 0 
D0880  35 Trailer, Tank, Water, 400 Gal, M149A2 
D0881  35 Trailer, Ribbon, MK18/A1  
D1001  30 Truck, Ambulance, 4 Litter, Armored, 1 1/4-Ton, HMMWV, M997 
D1002  30 Truck, Ambulance, 2 Litter, Soft Top, 1 1/4-Ton, HMMWV, M1035 
D1059  30 Truck, Cargo, 5-Ton, 6x6, M813A1/M923A1/M925A1 
D1061  30 Truck, Cargo, 5-Ton, XLMB, M814/M927/M928 
D1062  30 Truck, Cargo, 5-Ton, XLWB M927/M928 
D1064  30 Truck, Aircraft Crash/Structure Firefighting, A/S32P-19A 
D1072  30 Truck, Dump 6x6, 5-Ton, M817/M929/M930 
D1125  30 Truck, Utility, TOW Carrier, w/SA 1 1/4-Ton, w/Winch, HMMWV, M1045/M1046 
D1134  30 Truck, Tractor, 5-Ton, 6x6, M818/M931 
D1158  30 Truck, Utility, Cargo, Trp Carr, 1 1/4-Ton, w/equip, M998 
D1159  30 Truck, Utility, ARMT Carrier, 1 1/4-Ton, HMMWV, M1043/M1044 
D1160  30 Truck, Fast Attack (Interim) 1.5 Ton Truck 04751E 
D1180  30 Truck, Utility, Shelter Carrier, HMMWV, 1 ¼ Ton M1037/M1042  
D1212  30 Truck, Wrecker, 5-Ton, M816/M936 
E0149  40 Bridge, Scissor for AVLB 
E0150  40 Launcher, Bridge, Armored Vehicle, M60A1 
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E0180  43 Circle, Aiming, M2A2 
E0207  48 Command Launch Unit, Javelin M98A1 
E0277  13 Data Disiplay Group OD144(V) 
E0330  48 Equipment Set, Night Vision, AN/UAS-12A/C 
E0665  43 Howitzer, Medium, Towed 155MM, M198 
E0726  49 Interrogator Set, Programmer, AN/GSX-1 (STINGER) 
E0727  49 Interrogator Set, IFF, AN/PPX-3B, (STINGER)  
E0796  41 Assault Amphibious Vehicle, Command/Communications, AAVC7A1 
E0846  41 Assault Amphibious Vehicle, Personnel, AAVP7A1 
E0856  41 Assault Amphibious Vehicle, Recovery, AAVR7A1 
E0915  48 Launcher, Assault Rocket, 83mm, MK153, Mod 0 
E0935  48 Launcher, Tubular F/GM (TOW), M220E4 
E0940  42 Light Armored Vehicle, Air Defense, LAV-AD 
E0942  42 Light Armored Vehicle, Anti-Tank, LAV-AT 
E0946  42 Light Armored Vehicle, Command/Control, LAV-C2 
E0947  42 Light Armored Vehicle, 25mm, LAV-25 
E0948  42 Light Armored Vehicle, Logistics, LAV-L 
E0949  42 Light Armored Vehicle, Mortar, LAV-M 
E0950  42 Light Armored Vehicle, Maint/Recovery, LAV-R 
E0980  46 Machinegun, .50 Cal Browning, M2 
E0984  46 Machinegun, Cal .50, M48 
E0989  46 Machinegun, 7.62mm, M240G 
E0994  46 Machinegun, 40mm, MK-19, Mod 3 
E0998  46 Machinegun, 7.62mm, LM, M240 
E1035  43 Meteorological Station Group 
E1045  43 MULE, AN/PAQ-3 
E1065  46 Mortar, 60mm, M224 
E1095  46 Mortar, 81mm, M252 
E1145  43 Muzzle Velocity System, M94 
E1159  46 Night Vision Sight, Crew Served Weapon, AN/TVS-5 
E1210  43 PADS, AN/USQ-70 
E1377  40 Recovery Vehicle, Medium, Full-Tracked, M88A1 
E1378  40 Recovery Vehicle, FT. Heavy, w/Equipment M88A2 
E1460  46 Rifle, Sniper, M40A1 
E1475  46 Rifle Sniper, Semi-Auto, .50 Cal, Repeater, M82A2A 
E1836  49 Control Central Guided Missile, Avenger Fire Unit, AN/TWQ-1 
E1837  49 Receiver, Infrared AN/PAS-18 
E1888  40 Tank, Combat, Full-Tracked, 120mm Gun, M1A1 
E1906  40 Direct Support Electrical System Test Set (DSESTS), AN/USM-615 
E1911  48 Test Set, Missile Guidance, AN/TSM-152 
E1912  48 Field Test Set, TOW, AN/TSM-140B 
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APPENDIX C: FUNCTIONAL AREA DESCRIPTION 
FA 
Code Description 
10  Radios  
11  Communications Support Equipment  
13  Air Command/Control Equipment  
14  Air Support Radar/IFF Equipment  
16  Electronic Equipment  
18  Tactical Remote Sensor Equipment  
19  Intelligence/Surveillance Equipment  
20  Generators  
21  Environmental Control Equipment  
23  Earthmoving Equipment  
26  Materials Handling Equipment  
29  Engineer Support  
30  Trucks  
35  Towed Motor Transport Equipment  
40  Tanks  
41  Assault Amphibious Vehicles 
42  Light Armored Vehicles  
43  Artillery  
46  Infantry Weapons  
48  Anti-Armor Weapon Systems and Direct Support Equipment 
49  Missile Systems  
50  High Density/Low Deadline  
97  Communications Security Equipment  
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